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The Donald Rumsfeld I Know
On Iraq, Rumsfeld helped President Bush analyze the dangers posed by Saddam Hussein's regime. Given Hussein's history -- starting wars; using chemical weapons against foreign and domestic enemies; and training, financing and otherwise supporting various terrorists -- Rumsfeld helped make the case that leaving him in power entailed significant risks. But in October 2002, Rumsfeld also wrote a list of the risks involved in removing Hussein from power. (I called the list his "parade of horribles" memo.) He reviewed it in detail with the president and the National Security Council. Rumsfeld's warnings about the dangers of war -- including the perils of a post-Hussein power vacuum -- were more comprehensive than anything I saw from the CIA, State or elsewhere.
Though we knew that the risks involved in ousting Hussein were high, it hardly means that Bush made the wrong decision to invade. I believe he made the correct call; we had grounds to worry about the threats Hussein posed, especially after 9/11 reduced our tolerance for security risks. But Rumsfeld helped the president see that he had no risk-free option for dealing with the dangers Hussein posed.
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Rumsfeld has been attacked for insisting that troop levels for the Iraq operation be kept low, supposedly out of ideology and contrary to the advice of the military. What I saw, however, was that Rumsfeld questioned standard military recommendations for "overwhelming force." He asked if such force was necessary for the mission. And he asked what the consequences might be of having a large footprint in Iraq and playing into propaganda about the United States wanting to take over the country.
But Rumsfeld never told Gen. John Abizaid or Gen. Tommy Franks that U.S. Central Command could not have the number of troops that the commanders deemed necessary. Rumsfeld is more politically sensitive than that -- he would never expose himself to the risk of a commander later saying that he had denied him the forces needed. If other generals are unhappy with the troop levels in Iraq, the problem is not that they failed to persuade Rumsfeld, but that they failed to persuade Abizaid or Franks.
Historians will sort out whether Rumsfeld was too pushy with his military, or not pushy enough; whether he micromanaged Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority, or gave them too much slack. I know more about these issues than most people, yet I don't have all the information for a full analysis. I do know, however, that the common view of Rumsfeld as a close-minded man, ideologically wedded to the virtues of a small force, is wrong.
Rumsfeld had to resign, I suppose, because the bitter political debate of recent years has turned him into a symbol. His effectiveness was damaged. For many in Congress and the public, the Rumsfeld caricature dominated their view of the Iraq war and the administration's ability to prosecute it successfully. Even if nominee Robert Gates pursues essentially the same strategy, he may command more public confidence.
What Rumsfeld believed, said and did differs from the caricature. The public picture of him today is drawn from news accounts reflecting the views of people who disapproved of his policies or disliked him. Rumsfeld, after all, can be brutally demanding and tough. But I believe history will be more appreciative of him than the first draft has been. What will last is serious history, which, like serious literature, can distinguish appearance from reality.
Douglas J. Feith, a professor at Georgetown University, served as undersecretary of defense for policy from 2001 to 2005.
