Bush-Maliki Summit Delayed

The leaked memo, written earlier this month by national security adviser Hadley, expressed the administration's private frustration with Maliki's performance and outlined a series of proposed steps for the United States and Iraq to take.

Among other things, the five-page document, which the Times posted on its Web site Tuesday night, suggested that Maliki should be pressured to distance himself from Sadr, a powerful anti-American Shiite cleric, and "bring to justice" figures in Sadr's militia who "do not eschew violence". The memo said Maliki should also be pushed to shake up his cabinet to include more nonsectarian technocrats; expand the Iraqi army; and declare the immediate suspension of Iraqi police units suspected of involvement in sectarian conflict.

Hadley proposed that the United States help Maliki build a new political coalition within the Iraqi parliament that would rely more on moderate, less sectarian elements rather than harder-line Shiite representatives. To accomplish this, Hadley said, money could be provided to Maliki's political operation and moderate parties. The Nov. 8 memo also raised the possibility of sending more forces to Iraq and recommended that U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad take a lower profile "and let Maliki take more credit for positive developments."

The memo laid bare the doubts about Maliki. Written shortly after Hadley met with the Iraqi prime minister, it noted concerns about various actions, including intervention to stop military action against Shiite targets, efforts to stack ministries with Shiite majorities and reported nondelivery of services to Sunni areas.

These actions "all suggest a campaign to consolidate Shia power in Baghdad," Hadley wrote. "While there does seem to be an aggressive push to consolidate Shia power and influence, it is less clear whether Maliki is a witting participant." Hadley wrote that Maliki "impressed me as a leader who wanted to be strong but was having difficulty figuring out how to do so."

White House officials traveling with Bush declined to speak on the record about the contents of the memo, noting that it remains a classified document. But press secretary Tony Snow said Wednesday morning: "The president has confidence in Prime Minister Maliki. The administration is working with the prime minister to improve his capabilities in terms of dealing with the fundamental problems in Iraq."

Speaking on background, one senior administration said the memo was not intended to offer a "summary judgment" about the Maliki government and was "not a slap in the face."

"The broad conclusion . . . is that the big deficiency is capability," this official said. "It is something we have acknowledged. It is one of the central tenets of this meeting-- which is how to do we increase his capability to turn his good intentions, as described in this memo, into concrete action."

Another official said Maliki and Bush will continue to have a good personal relationship despite the ideas expressed in the memo. Bush, he said, has an "ability to go in and talk candidly about the challenges that the Maliki government faces . . . The approach of this government is how can we help Prime Minister Maliki."

Hadley on Tuesday offered reporters a sober assessment of the Maliki government. He said efforts to secure Baghdad by U.S. and Iraqi forces have "not produced adequate progress in an acceptable time frame." He said Maliki had taken steps to reconcile warring religious and political factions but "obviously they have a long way to go."

Contrary to the doubts expressed in his memo, however, Hadley emphasized to reporters that he was not criticizing Maliki, adding that he disagreed with the view in Iraq that Maliki is ineffectual.

"We think that this unity government is doing pretty well in a very difficult situation," he said. "Maliki has been impatient and has said that his government has not produced the results they seek. And he's got some ideas about how to enhance their capabilities to do so."

Aides to Bush said Tuesday that they did not expect the summit in Amman to lead to any major public pronouncements, in part because the broader White House Iraq review is not yet complete. But the meetings, the third between the two leaders since Maliki took office in May, will offer an opportunity to resolve tensions between the two governments over how to proceed.

The Bush-Maliki relationship had started with high hopes among White House officials that the prime minister would prove a more effective leader than his predecessor, Ibrahim al-Jafari. After a quick trip to Baghdad in June, Bush declared he had determined that Maliki was dedicated to a free Iraq.

But the relationship has grown fractious as repeated efforts to curb violence in Baghdad have failed. Administration aides have expressed frustration that Maliki has not moved more aggressively against Shiite Muslim militias, while Maliki has bristled at pressure from Washington.

Sadr, the leader of one of the most powerful militias, is a key supporter of Maliki's government and a growing political power in the country. Curbing militias such as Sadr's Mahdi Army and bringing sectarian fighting under control are considered critical tests of Iraq's ability to govern itself -- and of the ability of U.S. forces to withdraw without leaving behind a chaotic situation.

The Sadr faction had strongly criticized Maliki's plan to meet with Bush. Last week, after a barrage of car bombs, mortars and missiles killed more than 200 people in the Shiite slums of Baghdad that are a stronghold for the militia, Sadr's bloc vowed to pull out of the government if the summit went forward. The attacks in the Sadr City neighborhood were the deadliest assault against Iraqis since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003.

"The country is in the midst of a security crisis, and the presence of the prime minister is necessary," Bahaa al-Araji, a member of parliament from Sadr's bloc, said on Tuesday. "We are concerned that the prime minister may receive instructions from Bush on the security situation. We believe that the government must have the final say on such matters because the security situation is something that concerns Iraq and its government only."

On Wednesday, Hassan al-Suneid, an Islamic Dawa Party parliamentary member and close aide of Maliki, downplayed the significance of the Sadr boycott, describing it as "a sort of protest".

"They need to show their political attitude against the meeting of Maliki and Bush," said Suneid. "The suspension is very normal for any parliament member and it could last for three or four days."

Joost Hiltermann, who follows Iraq for the nonprofit International Crisis Group from Jordan, voiced skepticism that Maliki would crack down on private militias. "He is completely beholden to the Sadrists," he said. "The notion that he could confront the power of the militias that gave him power is absurd."

"There is a problem with saying that we need to get the Iraqis to take charge of the situation," said Eliot A. Cohen, a professor of military strategy at Johns Hopkins University. "By virtue of the kind of government we helped create -- particularly one based on proportional representation -- and because the institutions of the Iraqi state are weak, even if we can get him to promise, we cannot reasonably expect him to deliver much."

Abramowitz reported from Riga, Latvia; Wilgoren reported from Washington. Special correspondent K.I. Ibrahim in Baghdad and staff writers Peter Baker and Thomas E. Ricks in Washington contributed to this report.