Rumsfeld Called for Change in War Plan

Rumsfeld's ideas did not depart radically from the alternative strategies emerging so far from the bipartisan Iraq Study Group or from other military and governmental Iraq policy reviews initiated in recent weeks.

For example, Rumsfeld called for significantly increasing the number of U.S. military trainers embedded with Iraqi forces, and, in a twist, for "a reverse embeds program" that would place Iraqi soldiers with American squads, partly to boost the Arabic-language skills of U.S. troops.

Several options Rumsfeld raised involve withdrawing or pulling back the 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq as a way to pressure the Iraqi government to take greater responsibility for its own security. This idea, favored by many Democrats in Congress, has not been publicly embraced by Rumsfeld to such a degree. Still, Rumsfeld wrote that he opposed setting a firm withdrawal date.

"Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start 'taking our hand off the bicycle seat'), so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up, and take responsibility for their country," Rumsfeld wrote.

Rumsfeld suggested using the security provided by U.S. troops in a carrot-and-stick approach, providing security only for provinces and cities that fully cooperate with U.S. forces. Similarly, reconstruction aid should go only to "those parts of Iraq that are behaving," he wrote, adding: "No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence."

Options the defense secretary characterized as "less attractive" involved U.S. troop increases, such as a surge in U.S. forces into Baghdad or substantially increasing the number of American combat brigades in Iraq. The only place he recommended a U.S. troop increase was along Iraq's borders with Syria and Iran.

Rumsfeld's well-known frustration with other branches of the U.S. government comes through repeatedly in the memo and is far blunter than the secretary has been in public. He called for reaching out to U.S. military retirees and reservists to "aggressively beef up" Iraqi ministries, adding, "i.e. give up on trying to get other USG Departments to do it."

Similarly, he called for a "massive program for unemployed youth" but said it would have to be run by U.S. forces, "since no other organization could do it."

Retired Army Col. Andrew Bacevich, now a professor of international relations at Boston University, said his impression of the memo is that it is a "laundry list" of current ideas entirely lacking in analysis.

"The memo is a tacit admission of desperation and of impending failure," said Bacevich, who has been critical of the conduct of the war.

People in Washington familiar with the workings of the Pentagon and the media were suspicious of the motives behind the leak of the memo.

Retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, an Iraq veteran who has been critical of Rumsfeld, said he was bothered by both the timing and the substance of the memo.

"For Mr. Rumsfeld to write this leaked memo, saying things aren't going well, is disingenuous and self-serving," said Eaton.

But he added that he did not think it would affect the morale of troops or officers serving in Iraq, saying he thought they would dismiss it as irrelevant "high-level politics."

Staff writers Thomas E. Ricks and Michael Abramowitz contributed to this report.