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Panel To Urge Pressure On Iraq
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At the same time, the source said, the U.S. military strategy ought to be implemented regardless of whether Iraqis meet their benchmarks. But the commission warns against turning over control of security to Iraqi forces until reforms are in place.
Clifford May, one of the working group's advisers and a former Republican Party spokesman, was one of two advisers who opposed withdrawal and supported Bush's strategy, but he said he "was willing to concede from the start that what Bush hoped for is probably not achievable. But it doesn't mean that nothing is achievable."
May said the report includes "at least 70 recommendations," but a timetable for troop withdrawal is not among them. "Instead, it says we have a mission that can be accomplished, and it defines that mission as the need to leave behind a government that can sustain itself," May said.
Much debate in e-mail exchanges among the most outspoken advisers to the study group focused on whether adding troops would help. But most feared that bringing in the large numbers required would break the military, lead to a surge in U.S. deaths and do nothing to better protect civilians.
In the end, the experts did not agree on sending additional forces beyond military advisers for the Iraqi national army. They seemed certain that Bush would reject most of their recommendations and that few could work anyway.
"Very early on, the notion of achieving some sort of victory didn't take," said Chas W. Freeman Jr., a former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia. "So if victory is not possible and not feasible, even if you could define it, then what you're left with is to find some way to mitigate defeat."
James Dobbins, a principal U.S. architect of the Afghan reconciliation process, said he supported "an intensified regional dialogue that would be comprehensive and encompass all of Iraq's neighbors." But he and others on the staff said a push for more U.S. engagement with Israel and the Palestinians was rarely discussed beyond a few e-mail exchanges.
"It was kind of assumed by everybody that if the U.S. devoted more attention to it, it would be a good thing in its own right, but we didn't devote much time to that, so if it becomes a recommendation, it would likely come directly from Baker and Hamilton," said Kurtzer, who served as U.S. ambassador to Israel and Egypt.
Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.




