Iraq Study Group Report

"[T]he Syrians look the other way as arms and foreign fighters flow across their border into Iraq, and former Baathist leaders find a safe haven within Syria." (p.29)

The Rest of the Region

"Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states . . . for the most part have been passive and disengaged. They have declined to provide debt relief or substantial economic assistance to the Iraqi government." (p. 29)

"The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional instability. There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts . . . [including] direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel's right to exist), and Syria." (p.xv)

Iraq's Government

"The composition of the Iraqi government is basically sectarian, and key players within the government too often act in their sectarian interest." (p.12)

"The security situation cannot improve unless leaders act in support of national reconciliation. Shiite leaders must make the decision to demobilize militias. Sunni Arabs must make the decision to seek their aims through a peaceful political process, not through violent revolt. The Iraqi government and Sunni Arab tribes must aggressively pursue al Qaeda." (p.19)

"The Iraqi government is not effectively providing its people with basic services: electricity, drinking water, sewage, health care, and education. In many sectors, production is below or hovers around prewar levels. In Baghdad and other unstable areas, the situation is much worse." (p.20)

"The United States should work closely with Iraq's leaders to support the achievement of specific objectives--or milestones--on national reconciliation, security, and governance. Miracles cannot be expected, but the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress. The Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens--and the citizens of the United States and other countries--that it deserves continued support." (page 59)

"If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government." (page 61)

"The point is not for the United States to set timetables or deadlines for withdrawal, an approach that we oppose. The point is for the United States and Iraq to make clear their shared interest in the orderly departure of U.S. forces as Iraqi forces take on the security mission." (page 67)

Iraq's Military and Police

"The problems in the Iraqi police and criminal justice system are profound." (page 78)

"The Iraqi criminal justice system is weak, and the U.S. training mission has been hindered by a lack of clarity and capacity." (page 81)

"Significant questions remain about the ethnic composition and loyalties of some Iraqi units--specifically, whether they will carry out missions on behalf of national goals instead of a sectarian agenda . . . Units lack leadership . . . equipment. . . personnel . . . logistics and support." (p.8-9)

"The state of the Iraqi police is substantially worse than that of the Iraqi Army . . . Iraqi police cannot control crime, and they routinely engage in sectarian violence, including the unnecessary detention, torture and targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians." (p.9-10)

al-Qaeda

"Terrorism could grow. As one Iraqi official told us, 'Al-Qaeda is now a franchise in Iraq, like McDonald's.' " (p.34)

"Al Qaeda is responsible for a small portion of the violence in Iraq, but that includes some of the more spectacular acts . . . Al Qaeda in Iraq is now largely Iraqi-run and composed of Sunni Arabs. Foreign fighters--numbering an estimated 1,300--play a supporting role or carry out suicide operations." (p.4)

Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds

Shiite militias "are fragmenting, with an increasing breakdown in command structure . . . The prevalence of militias sends a powerful message: political leaders can preserve and expand their power only if backed by armed force. The Mahdi Army . . . may number as many as 60,000 fighters." (p.5)

"The Shia, the majority of Iraq's population, have gained power for the first time in more than 1,300 years." (p.13)

"Sunni Arabs feel displaced because of the loss of their traditional position of power in Iraq." (p.15)

"Iraqi Kurds have succeeded in presenting a united front of two main political blocs -- the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)." (p.16)