Doubts About Iraqi Leader's Capabilities Persist

"They see no alternative, and they have scoured the lists looking for alternatives," said Gelb, who has advocated giving more power to Iraq's regions. "They're going to stick with him and keep pushing on the same open doors they have pushed in for the last three years -- try to make a central government run that just can't work."

The Bush administration also appears to be following a political strategy laid out in the Hadley memo, hoping that Maliki will be able to form a new coalition of moderate parties, including the two largest Shiite parties, the two major Kurdish parties and the Iraqi Islamic Party, a Sunni party. That would diminish Maliki's dependence on Sadr, who controls 30 seats in parliament and five ministries but who also runs the most powerful militia in Iraq, the Mahdi Army.

Toward that end, Bush consulted in recent weeks with other leading Iraqi politicians, including the top Kurds; Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a leading Sunni; and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a top Shiite group. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice indicated to Washington Post reporters last week that the conversations were focused on building support for the Maliki government.

"Iraqis are really the only ones, ultimately, who can solve the sectarian problem," Rice said. "We can help. We can support. We can do a lot of things. But, ultimately, they are the ones who can solve it, and that's been much the nature of the conversation."

Graham said that when Maliki was asked about his ties to Sadr during his session with the senators last week, Maliki acknowledged that militias "are the biggest threat to his government -- no matter who they are." Graham is advocating a surge of new troops into Baghdad to help restore security, but he emphasized that if Maliki does not make a "bold move" politically, "the amount of troops will make no difference."

Some U.S. officials fear that a move by Maliki to assemble a new national reconciliation government might not be enough to generate movement on the most fundamental problems, say officials familiar with the internal debate. Many of the other political leaders -- in parliament and in Maliki's cabinet, as well as influential leaders in society such as tribal chiefs -- either condone militias or have their own.

An official familiar with the review debate said that if the current situation continues -- with a weak prime minister possessing limited loyalty from his appointed cabinet and the parties that share power -- then Maliki is "not going to be able to make serious progress on political reconciliation, controlling the militias or commanding the military."

John D. Negroponte, the director of national intelligence, offered a measured assessment of Maliki when he met with Post reporters and editors last week. He acknowledged that it has been difficult for Maliki to take on Sadr because of the role Sadr supporters play in his parliamentary bloc.

"I think the prime minister understands and would agree that the extremes on both sides of the political spectrum in Iraq have to be dealt with," Negroponte said in the interview. "How is he going to do? He is working through that situation as we speak. . . . It is important that he be successful, and we want to support him."