Pressed in Iraq, U.S. Army turns out interrogators

In April 2004, pictures that showed American soldiers using such techniques at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad shocked the world, damaged America's image and prompted contentious debates over the definition of torture.

Fast, one of the few army women to make major general, was the highest-ranking U.S. intelligence officer in Iraq at the time of the Abu Ghraib scandal. An army investigation cleared her of wrongdoing and she was promoted to command the Intelligence Center in March 2005.

"There is no way you can rule out misbehavior entirely," Fast said, "but there are measures in place now, checks and balances, which make it very difficult."

The Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners and the protection of civilians are part of the curriculum at Fort Huachuca. The field manual expressly bans eight interrogation techniques that had been used at Abu Ghraib and the U.S. detention and interrogation camp at Guantanamo Bay.

During their Arizona training, future interrogators practice 19 "approaches" to detainees. Explained in detail in the field manual, these techniques range from the "emotional love approach" and the "incentive approach" to the "emotional fear-up approach."

To avoid incidents that could backfire on the interrogator -- or America's image -- the instructions carry warnings. For example: "The HUMINT collector must be extremely careful that he does not threaten or coerce a source. Conveying a threat may be a violation of the UCMJ (Uniform Code of Military Justice)."

The manual lists three interrogation techniques that require specific approval from a senior officer.

These are: "Mutt and Jeff," a version of the good cop-bad cop routine used by police; "false flag," a technique to trick a detainee into believing his questioners are from a country other than the United States; and "separation" to keep detainees apart from each other. That approach requires approval from a four-star general.

In the arduous debates that led to the new manual, according to officials involved in the process, a sizable body of opinion held that making details of interrogation techniques public handed an advantage to Iraqi insurgents and other anti-U.S. forces because they would know what to expect.

But that view did not prevail and the army posted the manual on its Web site in September.