Opening Remarks: Senated Armed Services Committee Hearing on Iraq

Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) Chairman, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Gen. Peter Pace

SEN. JOHN W. WARNER, R-VA. RANKING MEMBER: As a consequence of the recent election, and as a consequence of the rules of the Republican caucus, I step down as chairman.

The Senate has yet not reorganized, so the designated chairman, Senator Levin, desires that we adhere to the strict rules.

And at this time, I pass the gavel to my good friend, Senator McCain for such purposes as he may wish to make of it.

MCCAIN: May be one of the shortest passages in history.

(LAUGHTER)

LEVIN: I think we'll stop it right there, as a matter of fact.

Thank you.

MCCAIN: Congratulations, Senator Levin. And I look forward to working in the same strong bipartisan fashion which has characterized your and my membership on this committee for many years.

We thank Senator Warner for his great job that he did as chairman of this committee. We congratulate you and look forward to working with you.

LEVIN: Thank you, Senator McCain.

WARNER: I join in those remarks.

LEVIN: Feelings are very, very mutual, indeed.

And Senator Warner has set a style here that I intend to emulate in terms of bipartisanship; has been a tradition of this committee. And that will continue, I know.

And I know it's your intention that it continue, as well, Senator McCain.

We're going to have, apparently, two votes coming up here in about 20 or 25 minutes, and we'll see how that will be handled when we get to that point.

But let me first welcome Secretary Gates, General Pace to the committee this morning.

Now, this is Secretary Gates' first appearance before this committee as secretary of defense.

We anticipate and look forward to many more, Mr. Secretary, and I hope you do too.

We congratulate you on your confirmation, of course.

We hope both of you will convey to our troops and their families the gratitude of this committee for their dedication, their sacrifices and their service to our country.

LEVIN: I also want to say a special welcome to the new members of this committee: Senator Pryor, who is returning for a second tour of duty, Senator Webb, Senator McCaskill and Senator Martinez.

All of us share the common goal of trying to maximize the chances of success in Iraq.

The reason that I oppose increasing the number of U.S. troops in Iraq, as the president outlined this week, is because I do not believe that that will help us achieve success in Iraq. In fact, I believe that the policy will help prolong the violence in Iraq and make it harder to achieve this goal while increasing the loss of American lives and treasure.

Increasing the number of U.S. forces in Iraq is flawed strategy because it is based on a false premise that there is a military solution to the violence and instability in Iraq when what is needed is a political solution among the Iraqi leaders and factions.

Iraq's own prime minister, Maliki, acknowledged recently that, quote, "The crisis is political. And the ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the politicians," close quote.

Our sending more troops to Iraq suggests that the future of Iraq is in our hands when in reality it is in the hands of the Iraqis themselves.

And Wednesday evening, the president said that he had made clear to Iraq's leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended.

I welcome those words. But the reality behind the president's new rhetoric is that the open-ended commitment continues. More American military men and women would be sent into the chaos of Iraq's sectarian violence without condition, without limitation.

LEVIN: President Bush indicated that the Iraqi government needs, quote, "breathing space" to make political progress. I believe the opposite is true" The Iraqi leaders don't need breathing space; they must feel real pressure to reach a political settlement.

Increasing our military presence in Iraq takes more pressure off. The Iraq Study Group put it this way last month, quote, "An open-ended commitment of American forces would not provide the Iraqi government the incentive it needs to take the political actions that give Iraq the best chance of quelling sectarian violence."

President Bush also said the Iraqis have set benchmarks for themselves. But look at the track record of the Iraqi government in meeting some of its past benchmarks and promises.

Iraqi President Talabani said in August of 2006 the Iraqi forces would, quote, "take over security in all Iraqi provinces by the end of 2006." That pledge has not been kept.

Prime Minister Maliki said last June that he would disband the militias and illegal armed groups as part of his national reconciliation plan. And in October he set the timetable for disbanding the militias as the end of 2006. That commitment has not been kept.

The Iraqi constitutional review commission was to present its recommendations for changes in the constitution to the Council of Representatives within four months of the formation of the government last May. The commission is yet to formulate any recommendations.

Prime Minister Maliki put forward a series of reconciliation milestones to be completed by the end of 2006 or early 2007, including approval of the provincial election law, the petroleum law, a new deBaathification law and the militia law. None of those laws have been enacted as committed.

LEVIN: The Iraqi army pledged six battalions in support of American and coalition efforts during Operation Forward Together last summer. In fact, Iraqis provided only two battalions.

That is not a track record that inspires confidence in Iraqi pledges and commitments.

The president said that Iraq -- the president said that America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced -- his words. But how did the president say we're going to do that? What will the consequences be if the Iraqis fail to meet these benchmarks, particularly since some of them have been established and missed in the past?

The president said that, quote, "If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people" -- his words. Well, that's an empty threat, given the fact that the Iraqi government has already lost the support of the American people and it hasn't affected their behavior.

The president's most recent plan, like the previous ones, includes no mechanism to hold the Iraqis to their commitments.

Deepening our involvement in Iraq would be a mistake, but deepening our involvement in Iraq on the assumption that the Iraqis will meet future benchmarks and commitments, given their track record, would be a compounding of that mistake.

We must also be mindful of what the president's increase in U.S. forces would mean for our already over-stretched armed forces. Sending more troops to Iraq will have a negative affect on our soldiers, their families and on the ability of this nation to respond to other contingencies that may arise.

LEVIN: The combat brigades now in Iraq will be extended beyond their normal tours by as much as four months, as has happened at least twice before.

Additional combat brigades would need to be deployed; brigades which will be short of personnel and equipment because the state of readiness of Army and Marine Corps units that are not currently deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan is low. Many of these brigades will have only been back from their last deployment less than 12 months. Many of the soldiers in those brigades will have had much less than 12 months with their families because they have to train up for their next deployment. That violates current policy and good practice and will harm the morale and retention down the road.

Just two months General Abizaid testified before this committee against increasing the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. He said, quote, "I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the corps commander, General Dempsey. We all talked together. And I said, 'In your professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq?' And they all said no. And the reason is," General Abizaid said, "because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon to us do this work. I believe," he said, "that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more -- from taking more responsibility for their own future," close quote.

General Casey made that same point on January 2nd when he said, quote, "The longer that U.S. forces continue to bear the main burden of Iraq's security, it lengthens the time that the government of Iraq has to take the hard decisions about reconciliation and dealing with the militias. And the other thing is that they can continue to blame us for all of Iraq's problems, which are at base their problems." That was General Casey.

For America to supply more troops while the Iraqi leaders simply supply more promises is not a recipe for success in Iraq. Telling the Iraqis that we will increase our troops to give them yet more breathing space will only postpone the day when Iraqis take their future into their own hands and decide whether they want to continue to fight a civil war or to make peace among themselves.

Senator McCain?

MCCAIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I join you in welcoming our witnesses here today.

And I'm very pleased to serve again with the returning members of our committee. And I, again, would like to welcome all the new members to the committee.

MCCAIN: Mr. Chairman, it's a hard thing to change course in the middle of a war.

I commend the president for recognizing the mistakes of the past and for outlining new steps on the military, economic and political fronts. I believe that together these moves will give the Iraqis and America the best chance of success.

We should make no mistake: Potentially catastrophic consequences of failure demand that we do all we can to prevail in Iraq. A substantial and sustained increase in U.S. forces in Baghdad and Anbar province is necessary to bring down the toxic levels of violence there.

There is much agreement that the dire situation in Iraq demands a political solution. That is true.

But we must also realize what it will take to enable any political situation: simply impossible for meaningful, political and economic activity to take place in an environment riddled with violence as Baghdad is today.

Security is a precondition for political and economic progress. Until the government and its coalition allies can protect the population, the Iraqi people will increasingly turn to extra- governmental forces, especially Sunni and Shia militias, for protection.

Only when the government has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force will its authority have meaning, and only when its authority has meaning can political activity have the results we seek.

The presence of additional coalition forces would allow the Iraqi government to do what it cannot accomplish today on its own: impose its rule throughout the country.

MCCAIN: They can do this by engaging in traditional counterinsurgency activities aimed at protecting the population and breaking the cycle of violence.

In bringing greater security to Iraq, and chiefly to Baghdad, our forces would give the government a fighting chance to pursue reconciliation.

As I have said before, a small, short surge would be the worse of all worlds. We need troops in the numbers required to do the job in place for as long as it takes to complete their mission. We must ensure that we are committing sufficient numbers of additional troops, and I look forward to our witnesses' testimony on this score.

It would be far better to have too many reinforcements in Iraq than to suffer once again the tragic results of insufficient force levels.

The other elements of the president's strategy are also critical. The Iraqi government must meet new benchmarks, including a reconciliation process for insurgents and Baathists, more equitable distribution of government resources, sharing oil revenue with the entire Iraqi population, and holding provincial elections that will bring Sunnis into the government.

And Iraq's neighbors need to play a more constructive role. I'd like to see the Saudis, for example, to fund a major jobs creation program in Iraq. Gulf states must not fiddle while Baghdad burns.

I know that some of my colleagues disagree with a troop increase in Iraq, and I've heard the calls for a withdrawal to begin in four to six months.

MCCAIN: Those who advocate such a policy have a right, even an obligation, to join the debate on this issue. But I believe these individuals also have a responsibility to tell us what they believe are the consequences of withdrawal in Iraq. Do they not fear Iranian, Saudi and Turkish involvement in Iraq, a wider regional war, a haven for terrorists, a humanitarian catastrophe? Do they truly believe that we can walk away from Iraq?

We were able to walk away from Vietnam. If we walk away from Iraq, we'll be back, possibly in the context of a wider war in the world's most volatile region.

I believe that those who disagree with this new policy should indicate what they would propose to do if we withdraw and Iraq descends into chaos.

We've made many, many mistakes since 2003, and these will not be easily reversed. Even greater than the costs thus far and in the future, however, are the catastrophic consequences that would ensue from our failure in Iraq.

By surging troops and bringing security to Baghdad and other areas, we can give the Iraqis and their partners the best possible chance to succeed.

From everything I saw during my trip to Iraq last month, I believe that success is still possible. And I would not support this new strategy if I didn't think it had a real chance of success. But let us realize there are no guarantees.

By controlling the violence, we can pave the way for a political settlement. Once the government wields greater authority, however, Iraqi leaders must take significant steps on their own and they must do it right away.

Increasing U.S. troop levels will expose more brave Americans to danger and increase the number of American casualties.

MCCAIN: When Congress authorized this war, we were committing America to a mission that entails the greatest sacrifice a country can make, one that falls disproportionately on those Americans who love their country so much that they volunteer to risk their lives to accomplish that mission.

And when we authorized this war, we accepted the responsibility to make sure they could prevail.

Increasing deployments is a terrible sacrifice to impose on the best patriots among us. My travels and meeting with many servicemembers lead me to believe, however, that these Americans will once again do everything they can to win this war.

I will conclude by commending the president's announcement Wednesday night that he plans to increase the standing size of the Army and Marine Corps by some 92,000 soldiers and Marines. Such a step is long overdue, particularly given our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And I believe that the increase in end strength is in the national security interests of our country. I hope it will receive the backing of all senators.

Chairman Levin, again, thank you.

I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses today.

LEVIN: I thank you, Senator McCain, very much.

Let me note that Senators Bayh and Clinton are not here today because they're on a previously scheduled trip to Afghanistan and Iraq. But they want the witnesses to know that they intend to submit questions for the record.

Again, our thanks to you, Secretary Gates. You have taken on a huge responsibility and you've done it in a every -- with great -- I believe, great thoughtfulness. And we appreciate the reaching out which you have done to so many of us during the few weeks that you've been there and have had so many other responsibilities.

Secretary Gates?

GATES: Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee, let me say at the outset that it's a pleasure to appear before this committee for the first time as secretary of defense.

GATES: The Senate Armed Services Committee has long been a steadfast friend and ally of our men and women in uniform, and a source of steadfast support in meeting the nation's defense needs. And I thank you for that, and I look forward to working with you.

Let me begin by quickly summarizing two announcements I made yesterday morning, one of which Senator McCain just referred to.

I have recommended to the president an increase in the two services of 92,000 soldiers and Marines over the next five years: 65,000 soldiers and 27,000 Marines. The emphasis will be on increasing combat capability.

This increase will be accomplished in two ways. First, we'll propose to make permanent the temporary increase of 30,000 for the Army and 5,000 for the Marine Corps. We then propose to build up from that base in annual increment over five years: 7,000 troops a year for the Army until they reach 547,000; and 5,000 a year for the Marine Corps until they reach 202,000.

While it may take some time for these troops to become available for deployment, it is important for our men and women in uniform to know that additional manpower and resources are on the way.

Second, for several months the department has been assessing whether we have the right policies to govern how we manage and deploy members of the Reserves, the National Guard and our active component units. Based on this assessment and the recommendations of our military leadership, I am prepared to make the following changes to department policy.

First, mobilization of ground reserve forces will be managed on a unit basis instead of an individual basis. This change will allow us to achieve greater unit cohesion and predictability in how reserve units train and deploy.

Second, from this point forward, members of the reserves will be involuntarily mobilized for a maximum of one year at any one time, in contrast to the current practice of 16 to 24 months.

GATES: Third, the planning objective for Guard and Reserve units will remain one year of being mobilized, followed by five years demobilized. However, today's global demands will require a number of selected Guard and Reserve units to be remobilized sooner than this standard. Our intention is that such exceptions will be temporary.

The goal for the active force rotation cycle remains one year deployed for every two years at home station. Today, most active units are receiving one year at home station before deploying again.

We believe that mobilizing select Guard and Reserve units before their five-year period is complete will allow us to move closer to relieving the stress on the active -- on the total force.

Fourth, I'm directing the establishment of a new program to compensate individuals in both the active and reserve components that are required to mobilize or deploy early, or extend beyond the established rotation policy goals.

Fifth and finally, I am directing that all commands and units review how they administer the hardship waiver program, to ensure that they are properly taking into account exceptional circumstances facing military families of deployed servicemembers.

It's important to note that these policy changes have been under discussion for some time within the Department of Defense and would need to take place regardless of the president's announcement the other night.

Just as an aside, but an important one, I'm pleased to report to the committee that all active branches of the military exceeded their recruiting goals for the month of December, with particularly strong showings by the Army and the Marine Corps.

Our nation is truly blessed that so many talented and patriotic young people have stepped forward to defend our nation, and that so many service men and women have chosen to continue to serve.

With respect to the president's initiative, he described a new way forward in Iraq on Wednesday night, a new approach to overcoming the steep challenges facing us in that country and that part of the world.

I know many of you have concerns about the new strategy in Iraq, and in particular are skeptical of the Iraqi government's will and ability to act decisively against sectarian violence, and are skeptical, as well, about a commitment of additional troops.

GATES: The president and his national security team have had the same concerns as we have debated and examined our options in Iraq going forward.

And yet our commanders on the ground and the president's intended nominee as the new commander believe this is a sound plan, in no small part because General Casey and other senior military officers have worked closely with the Iraqi government in developing it.

Further, the president, Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey have had prolonged and extremely candid conversations, not just with Prime Minister Maliki but with other senior leaders of the Iraqi government, and have come away persuaded that they finally have the will to act against all instigators of violence in Baghdad.

This is, I think, a pivot point -- the pivot point in Iraq, as the Iraqi government insists on assuming the mantle of leadership in the effort to regain control of its own capital.

I want you to know that the timetable for the introduction of additional U.S. forces will provide ample opportunity early on, and before many of the additional U.S. troops arrive in Iraq, to evaluate the progress of this endeavor and whether the Iraqis are fulfilling their commitments to us.

Let me make two other quick points.

First, this strategy entails a strengthening across all aspects of the war effort, military and non-military, including the economic, governance and political areas.

Overcoming the challenges in Iraq cannot be achieved simply by military means, no matter how large or sustained, without progress by the Iraqis in addressing the underlying issues dividing the country.

Second, we must keep in mind the consequences of an American failure in Iraq. As I said in my confirmation hearing, developments in Iraq over the next year or two will shape the future of the Middle East and impact global geopolitics for a long time to come.

I would not have taken this position if I did not believe that the outcome in Iraq will have a profound and long-lived impact on our national interest. Mistakes certainly have been made by the United States in Iraq, but however we got to this moment, the stakes now are incalculable.

Your senior professional military officers in Iraq and at Washington believe in the efficacy of the strategy outlined by the president. They believe it is a sound plan that can work if the Iraqi government follows through on its commitments and if the non-military aspects of the strategy are implemented and sustained.

GATES: Our senior military officers have worked closely with the Iraqis to develop this plan. The impetus to add U.S. forces came initially from our commanders there.

It would be a sublime, yet historic, irony if those who believe the views of the military professionals were neglected at the onset of the war, were now to dismiss the views of the military as irrelevant or wrong.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LEVIN: Thank you very much, Secretary Gates.

General Pace?

PACE: Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain...

LEVIN: Let me interrupt you and forgive me for doing this.

The vote is now into the second half. And I think after you are concluded, General Pace, what we'll have to do here is to adjourn because there's two votes.

And so we will recess for perhaps 10 or 15 minutes, enough time for -- at least, for some of us to get back to begin our round of questions.

We'll do that immediately after you're finished, General Pace.

PACE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sir, I'd like to thank you and Senator McCain and all the members of the committee, as the secretary has done, for your very strong, bipartisan, sustained support of the military.

We appreciate all that you do for us.

I'd also like to thank all the members of the committee who go on fact-finding trips, visit the troops, and especially those of you -- most of you -- who have had a chance to visit the troops in hospitals.

PACE: That makes a difference. And the word gets out to the troops that you are visiting them and that you're visiting them not only where they're serving, but also when they're injured.

I'd like to take a minute to thank the troops publicly for what they do. It's an incredible honor for me to sit before you and represent them. They continue to perform magnificently and to do everything we've asked them to do.

And especially to thank their families, who are sacrificing for this nation, as well as anyone who's ever worn the uniform. The addition of troops, the extensions of troops all impact families, and we deeply appreciate what they do on the home front to provide support to the security of this nation.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, for just a minute outline the military plan that General Casey has worked with his commanders, side by side with the Iraqi commanders, in support of Prime Minister Maliki's initiative to change the political and economic environment in Iraq in a way that would allow for success militarily as well.

The plan calls for, in Baghdad, a senior Iraqi commander of Baghdad, under whom there will be two Iraqi division commandeers, one responsible for east of the river, one responsible for west of the river.

Below them will be nine districts, each commanded by an Iraqi brigade commander. And in those districts, there will be the support of a U.S. battalion partnered with those Iraqi units.

PACE: Inside each of those districts there will be three to four police stations that will be the hubs of activity for the Iraqi army, Iraqi police and U.S. forces. So the Iraqis can be in the lead doing the patrolling, doing the door-to-door census work and presence that'll be the hubs for the rapid reaction forces that will allow us to do this mission.

General Casey and his Iraqi counterparts did a troop-to-task analysis, meaning, "What do we need to do and how many troops do we need to do it?" In the process of doing that analysis, they needed more troops, both Iraqi and U.S. And General Casey and General Abizaid came forward and asked for additional troops for Baghdad.

The Iraqis will also provide additional troops. They have pledged to have three Iraqi brigades move from elsewhere in the country into Baghdad. These brigades and their commanders have been selected in coordination between General Casey and his counterpart, as have been the two division commanders and the nine brigade commanders who are going to be stationed in Baghdad.

This has been a collaborative effort, but one that has been supported by the prime minister. And the significant difference, in my opinion, is the pledge of the Iraqi leadership to allow for their commanders to work throughout Baghdad without regard to sectarian areas to bring rule of law to all criminals, to work in mixed neighborhoods and Sunni neighborhoods and Shia neighborhoods to bring the peace that is required.

But significantly, $10 billion of Iraqi money has been allocated, pledged to reconstruction efforts -- that is important and significant -- and a pledge from both of our governments, both Iraq and U.S., to increase economic activity to provide jobs to get the young men off the street and productively employed.

PACE: Out in al-Anbar province, where we've had recent success, the Marine commanders out there have asked for reinforcements to reinforce that success.

The Sunni sheiks in that area have taken on the Al Qaida mission themselves and, in fact, have encouraged their youth to join the local police. About 4,000 have been recruited so far, and about 1,000 of those are currently in training in Jordan and will come back to the Sunni neighborhoods and provide support.

Our commanders have then asked for the equivalent of one brigade plus-up out in al-Anbar, two brigades of U.S. and three brigades of Iraqi in Baghdad.

And they are happy to have the additional forces that are put in the pipeline on the U.S. side that are onwards to go, that can be turned off if not needed, but that can, in fact, arrive and reinforce success or be prepared to take action should the enemy do something that we have not already planned for.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LEVIN: Thank you very much, General.

We are now going to recess for about 15 minutes. Sorry for this, but that's the way the Senate operates.

(RECESS)