Nuclear Agency: Air Defenses Impractical

Some members of Congress and nuclear watchdog groups have argued that the requirements fall short of what is needed, given what was learned by the Sept. 11 attacks on the twin towers in New York and at the Pentagon.

These critics have argued that defenders of a reactor should be ready to face up to 19 attackers _ as was the case on Sept. 11 _ and expect them to have rocket-propelled grenades, so-called "platter" explosive charges and .50-caliber armor-piercing ammunition.

The NRC does not assume such weapons being used and rejected the idea of a 19-member attack force, maintaining that the Sept. 11 attacks actually were four separate attacks, each by four or five terrorists.

Sen. Barbara Boxer, D-Calif., said that NRC appears not to have followed the direction of Congress "to ensure that our nuclear power plants are protected from air- or land-based terrorist threats" of the magnitude demonstrated on Sept. 11.

The NRC "has missed an opportunity to provide the public with a real solution to the nuclear reactor security problem," said Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass., a frequent critic of the nuclear industry and the NRC.

Daniel Hirsch, president of the Community to Bridge the Gap, a California-based nuclear watchdog group that had urged the NRC to require physical barriers to keep planes from hitting reactors, called the security measures "irresponsible to the extreme."

"Rather than upgrading protections, (the NRC plan) merely codifies the status quo, reaffirming the existing, woefully inadequate security measures already in place at the nation's reactors," said Hirsch.

NRC officials have emphasized that the defense plan should require what is "reasonable" to be expected of a civilian security force at the 103 commercial nuclear power reactors.

In an unclassified summary of the DBT, the NRC maintains that studies "confirm the low likelihood" that an aircraft crashing into a reactor will damage the reactor core and release radioactivity, affecting public health and safety.

"Even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to a terrorist use of a large aircraft against a nuclear power plant, the studies indicate that there would be time to implement the required onsite mitigating actions," says the summary.

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On the Net:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission: http://www.nrc.gov

Nuclear Energy Institute: http://www.nei.org