Congressional Iraq War Resolutions

HOUSE

H. Con. Res. 63 :

Disapproving of the decision of the President announced on January 10, 2007, to deploy more than 20,000 additional United States combat troops to Iraq.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

February 12, 2007

Mr. SKELTON (for himself, Mr. LANTOS, and Mr. JONES of North Carolina) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Disapproving of the decision of the President announced on January 10, 2007, to deploy more than 20,000 additional United States combat troops to Iraq.

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That--

(1) Congress and the American people will continue to support and protect the members of the United States Armed Forces who are serving or who have served bravely and honorably in Iraq; and

(2) Congress disapproves of the decision of President George W. Bush announced on January 10, 2007, to deploy more than 20,000 additional United States combat troops to Iraq.

SENATE

S. Con. Res. 7:

Expressing the sense of Congress on Iraq

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

January 31, 2007

Mr. WARNER (for himself, Mr. NELSON of Nebraska, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. LEVIN, and Ms. SNOWE) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of Congress on Iraq.

Whereas we respect the Constitutional authorities given a President in article II, section 2, which states that `The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States'; it is not the intent of this resolution to question or contravene such authority, but to accept the offer to Congress made by the President on January 10, 2007, that, `if members have improvements that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust';

Whereas the United States strategy and operations in Iraq can only be sustained and achieved with support from the American people and with a level of bipartisanship;

Whereas over 137,000 American military personnel are currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent with the finest traditions of the United States Armed Forces, and are deserving of the support of all Americans, which they have strongly;

Whereas many American service personnel have lost their lives, and many more have been wounded, in Iraq, and the American people will always honor their sacrifices and honor their families;

Whereas the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, including their Reserve and National Guard organizations, together with components of the other branches of the military, are under enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan;

Whereas these deployments, and those that will follow, will have lasting impacts on the future recruiting, retention and readiness of our Nation's all volunteer force;

Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the Congress stated that `calendar year 2006 should be a period of significant transition to full sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq';

Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723, approved November 28, 2006, `determin[ed] that the situation in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security';

Whereas Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and ever-widening problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence based upon political distrust and cultural differences between some Sunni and Shia Muslims;

Whereas Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to reach such settlements to support a truly unified government greatly contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq;

Whereas the responsibility for Iraq's internal security and halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces;

Whereas U.S. Central Command Commander General John Abizaid testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, `I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all talked together. And I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And the reason is, because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future';

Whereas Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on November 27, 2006, that `The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the politicians';

Whereas there is growing evidence that Iraqi public sentiment opposes the continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq, much less increasing the troop level;

Whereas, in the fall of 2006, leaders in the Administration and Congress, as well as recognized experts in the private sector, began to express concern that the situation in Iraq was deteriorating and required a change in strategy; and, as a consequence, the Administration began an intensive, comprehensive review by all components of the Executive Branch to devise a new strategy;

Whereas, in December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy that includes `new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly';

Whereas, on January 10, 2007, following consultations with the Iraqi Prime Minister, the President announced a new strategy (hereinafter referred to as the `plan'), which consists of three basic elements: diplomatic, economic, and military; the central component of the military element is an augmentation of the present level of the U.S. military forces through additional deployments of approximately 21,500 U.S. military troops to Iraq;

Whereas, on January 10, 2007, the President said that the `Iraqi government will appoint a military commander and two deputy commanders for their capital' and that U.S. forces will `be embedded in their formations'; and in subsequent testimony before the Armed Services Committee on January 25, 2007, by the retired former Vice Chief of the Army it was learned that there will also be a comparable U.S. command in Baghdad, and that this dual chain of command may be problematic because `the Iraqis are going to be able to move their forces around at times where we will disagree with that movement', and called for clarification;

Whereas this proposed level of troop augmentation far exceeds the expectations of many of us as to the reinforcements that would be necessary to implement the various options for a new strategy, and led many members of Congress to express outright opposition to augmenting our troops by 21,500;

Whereas the Government of Iraq has promised repeatedly to assume a greater share of security responsibilities, disband militias, consider Constitutional amendments and enact laws to reconcile sectarian differences, and improve the quality of essential services for the Iraqi people; yet, despite those promises, little has been achieved;

Whereas the President said on January 10, 2007, that `I've made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended' so as to dispel the contrary impression that exists; and

Whereas the recommendations in this resolution should not be interpreted as precipitating any immediate reduction in, or withdrawal of, the present level of forces: Now, therefore, be it--

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that--

(1) the Senate disagrees with the `plan' to augment our forces by 21,500, and urges the President instead to consider all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic goals set forth below;

(2) the Senate believes the United States should continue vigorous operations in Anbar province, specifically for the purpose of combating an insurgency, including elements associated with the Al Qaeda movement, and denying terrorists a safe haven;

(3) the Senate believes a failed state in Iraq would present a threat to regional and world peace, and the long-term security interests of the United States are best served by an Iraq that can sustain, govern, and defend itself, and serve as an ally in the war against extremists;

(4) the Congress should not take any action that will endanger United States military forces in the field, including the elimination or reduction of funds for troops in the field, as such an action with respect to funding would undermine their safety or harm their effectiveness in pursuing their assigned missions;

(5) the primary objective of the overall U.S. strategy in Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political compromises that will foster reconciliation and strengthen the unity government, ultimately leading to improvements in the security situation;

(6) the military part of this strategy should focus on maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying international terrorists a safe haven, conducting counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability, supporting Iraqi efforts to bring greater security to Baghdad, and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full responsibility for their own security;

(7) United States military operations should, as much as possible, be confined to these goals, and should charge the Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating sectarian violence;

(8) the military Rules of Engagement for this plan should reflect this delineation of responsibilities, and the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should clarify the command and control arrangements in Baghdad;

(9) the United States Government should transfer to the Iraqi military, in an expeditious manner, such equipment as is necessary;

(10) the United States Government should engage selected nations in the Middle East to develop a regional, internationally sponsored peace-and-reconciliation process for Iraq;

(11) the Administration should provide regular updates to the Congress, produced by the Commander of United States Central Command and his subordinate commanders, about the progress or lack of progress the Iraqis are making toward this end; and

(12) our overall military, diplomatic, and economic strategy should not be regarded as an `open-ended' or unconditional commitment, but rather as a new strategy that hereafter should be conditioned upon the Iraqi government's meeting benchmarks that must be delineated in writing and agreed to by the Iraqi Prime Minister. Such benchmarks should include, but not be limited to, the deployment of that number of additional Iraqi security forces as specified in the plan in Baghdad, ensuring equitable distribution of the resources of the Government of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the oil resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner, and the authority of Iraqi commanders to make tactical and operational decisions without political intervention.

S. Con. Res. 2:

Expressing the bipartisan resolution on Iraq .

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

January 17, 2007

Mr. BIDEN (for himself, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. LEVIN, and Ms. SNOWE) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the bipartisan resolution on Iraq .

Whereas the United States strategy and presence on the ground in Iraq can only be sustained with the support of the American people and bipartisan support from Congress;

Whereas maximizing chances of success in Iraq should be our goal, and the best chance of success requires a change in current strategy;

Whereas the situation in Iraq is damaging the standing, influence, and interests of the United States in Iraq , the Middle East, and around the world;

Whereas more than 137,000 United States military personnel are bravely and honorably serving in Iraq and deserve the support of all Americans;

Whereas more than 3,000 United States military personnel have already lost their lives in Iraq , and more than 22,500 have been wounded in Iraq ;

Whereas on January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush announced his plan to deepen the United States military involvement in Iraq by deploying approximately 21,000 additional United States combat forces to Iraq ;

Whereas Iraq is witnessing widening sectarian and intra-sectarian violence;

Whereas Iraqis must reach a political settlement if there is going to be a reconciliation in Iraq , and the failure of the Iraqis to achieve such a settlement has led to the increase in violence in Iraq ;

Whereas Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on November 27, 2006, that `[t]he crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the politicians.';

Whereas an open-ended commitment of United States forces in Iraq is unsustainable and a deterrent to the Iraqis making the political compromises and providing the personnel and resources that are needed for violence to end and for stability and security to be achieved in Iraq ;

Whereas the responsibility for internal security and halting sectarian violence in Iraq must rest primarily with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi security forces;

Whereas there have been repeated promises by the Government of Iraq to assume a greater share of security responsibilities, disband militias, consider amendments to the Iraq constitution, enact laws to reconcile sectarian differences, and improve the quality of life for the Iraqi people, but those promises have not been kept;

Whereas a successful strategy in Iraq is dependent upon the Iraqi leaders fulfilling their promises;

Whereas the commander of the United States Central Command, General John Abizaid, testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, that `[i]t's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from taking more responsibility for their own future';

Whereas the Iraq Study Group suggested a comprehensive strategy to `enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly' based on `new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region';

Whereas the United States Army and Marine Corps, including their Reserves and the Army National Guard, their personnel, and their families, are under enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan;

Whereas the majority of nondeployed Army and Marine Corps units are no longer combat ready due to a lack of equipment and insufficient time to train; and

Whereas the United States strategy in Iraq must not compromise the ability of the United States to address other vital national security priorities, in particular global terror networks, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional stability in the Middle East, the nuclear program of Iran, the nuclear weapons of North Korea, and stability and security in Afghanistan: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that--

(1) it is not in the national interest of the United States to deepen its military involvement in Iraq , particularly by escalating the United States military force presence in Iraq ;

(2) the primary objective of United States strategy in Iraq should be to have the Iraqi political leaders make the political compromises necessary to end the violence in Iraq ;

(3) greater concerted regional, and international support would assist the Iraqis in achieving a political solution and national reconciliation;

(4) main elements of the mission of United States forces in Iraq should transition to helping ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq , conduct counterterrorism activities, reduce regional interference in the internal affairs of Iraq , and accelerate training of Iraqi troops;

(5) the United States should transfer, under an appropriately expedited timeline, responsibility for internal security and halting sectarian violence in Iraq to the Government of Iraq and Iraqi security forces; and

(6) the United States should engage nations in the Middle East to develop a regional, internationally-sponsored peace and reconciliation process for Iraq .

S. Con. Res. 4 :

Expressing the sense of Congress on Iraq.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

January 24, 2007

Mr. WARNER (for himself, Mr. NELSON of Nebraska, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. COLEMAN, Mr. SALAZAR, Mr. BAYH, Mr. SMITH, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mr. NELSON of Florida, and Mrs. MCCASKILL) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of Congress on Iraq.

Whereas we respect the constitutional authorities given a President in article II, section 2, which states that `The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States;' it is not the intent of this resolution to question or contravene such authority, but to accept the offer to Congress made by the President on January 10, 2007, that, `if members have improvements that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust';

Whereas the United States strategy and operations in Iraq can only be sustained and achieved with support from the American people and with a level of bipartisanship;

Whereas over 137,000 American military personnel are currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent with the finest traditions of the United States armed forces, and are deserving of the support of all Americans, which they have strongly;

Whereas many American service personnel have lost their lives, and many more have been wounded, in Iraq, and the American people will always honor their sacrifices and honor their families;

Whereas the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, including their Reserve and National Guard organizations, together with components of the other branches of the military, are under enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan;

Whereas these deployments, and those that will follow, will have lasting impacts on the future recruiting, retention and readiness of our Nation's all volunteer force;

Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the Congress stated that `calendar year 2006 should be a period of significant transition to full sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq';

Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723, approved November 28, 2006, `determin[ed] that the situation in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security';

Whereas a failed state in Iraq would present a threat to regional and world peace, and the long-term security interests of the United States are best served by an Iraq that can sustain, govern, and defend itself, and serve as an ally in the war against extremists;

Whereas Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and ever-widening problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence based upon political distrust and cultural differences between some Sunni and Shia Muslims;

Whereas Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to reach such settlements to support a truly unified government greatly contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq;

Whereas the responsibility for Iraq's internal security and halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces;

Whereas U.S. Central Command Commander General John Abizaid testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, `I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all talked together. And I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And the reason is, because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future';

Whereas Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on November 27, 2006, that `The crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the politicians';

Whereas there is growing evidence that Iraqi public sentiment opposes the continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq, much less increasing the troop level;

Whereas, in the fall of 2006, leaders in the Administration and Congress, as well as recognized experts in the private sector, began to express concern that the situation in Iraq was deteriorating and required a change in strategy; and, as a consequence, the Administration began an intensive, comprehensive review of the Iraq strategy, by all components of the Executive branch;

Whereas, in December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy that includes `new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly';

Whereas, on January 10, 2007, following consultations with the Iraqi Prime Minister, the President announced a new strategy (hereinafter referred to as the `plan'), the central element of which is an augmentation of the present U.S. military force structure through additional deployments of approximately 21,500 U.S. military troops to Iraq;

Whereas this proposed level of troop augmentation far exceeds the expectations of many of us as to the reinforcements that would be necessary to implement the various options for a new strategy, and led many members to express outright opposition to augmenting our troops by 21,500;

Whereas the Government of Iraq has promised repeatedly to assume a greater share of security responsibilities, disband militias, consider constitutional amendments and enact laws to reconcile sectarian differences, and improve the quality of essential services for the Iraqi people; yet, despite those promises, little has been achieved;

Whereas the President said on January 10, 2007, that `I've made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended' so as to dispel the contrary impression that exists; and

Whereas the recommendations in this resolution should not be interpreted as precipitating any immediate reduction in, or withdrawal of, the present level of forces: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that--

(1) the Senate disagrees with the `plan' to augment our forces by 21,500, and urges the President instead to consider all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic goals set forth below with reduced force levels than proposed;

(2) the primary objective of the overall U.S. strategy in Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political compromises that will foster reconciliation and strengthen the unity government, ultimately leading to improvements in the security situation;

(3) the military part of this strategy should focus on maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying international terrorists a safe haven, conducting counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability, and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full responsibility for their own security;

(4) United States military operations should, as much as possible, be confined to these goals, and should charge the Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating sectarian violence;

(5) the military Rules of Engagement for this plan should reflect this delineation of responsibilities;

(6) the United States Government should transfer to the Iraqi military, in an expeditious manner, such equipment as is necessary;

(7) the Senate believes the United States should continue vigorous operations in Anbar province, specifically for the purpose of combating an insurgency, including elements associated with the Al Qaeda movement, and denying terrorists a safe haven;

(8) the United States Government should engage selected nations in the Middle East to develop a regional, internationally sponsored peace-and-reconciliation process for Iraq;

(9) the Administration should provide regular updates to the Congress, produced by the Commander of United States Central Command and his subordinate commanders, about the progress or lack of progress the Iraqis are making toward this end; and

(10) our overall military, diplomatic and economic strategy should not be regarded as an `open-ended' or unconditional commitment, but rather as a new strategy that hereafter should be conditioned upon the Iraqi government's meeting benchmarks that must be specified by the Administration.

S. RES. 70

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the Commander of Multinational Forces-Iraq and all United States personnel under his command should receive from Congress the full support necessary to carry out the United States mission in Iraq.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

February 5, 2007

Mr. MCCAIN (for himself, Mr. LIEBERMAN, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. CORNYN, Mrs. HUTCHISON, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. THUNE, Mr. HATCH, and Mr. ROBERTS) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the Commander of Multinational Forces-Iraq and all United States personnel under his command should receive from Congress the full support necessary to carry out the United States mission in Iraq.

Whereas more than 137,000 members of the Armed Forces of the United States are currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent with the finest traditions of the Armed Forces of the United States, and deserve the support of all Americans;

Whereas past mistakes in United States strategy, aggression by various groups that reject peace, and other difficulties have contributed to a dire security situation in Iraq characterized by insurgent activity and sectarian violence;

Whereas a failed state in Iraq would present a threat to regional and world peace, and the long-term security interests of the United States are best served by an Iraq that can sustain, govern, and defend itself;

Whereas no amount of additional United States forces in Iraq can effect this outcome in Iraq unless the people and Government of Iraq take difficult political steps toward reconciliation;

Whereas the establishment of a basic level of security in Baghdad and throughout Iraq is an essential precondition for reconciliation and political and economic progress in Iraq;

Whereas these steps must include the fulfillment of military, political, and economic commitments that the Government of Iraq has made to the United States and to the people of Iraq;

Whereas Iraqi political leaders must show visible progress toward meeting specific benchmarks, including--

(1) deploying a significant number of new Iraqi security forces to partner with United States units in securing Baghdad;

(2) assuming responsibility for security in all provinces in Iraq in a timely manner;

(3) disarming individual militias as circumstances warrant and ensuring that security forces are accountable to the central government and loyal to the constitution of Iraq;

(4) ensuring equitable distribution of the resources of the Government of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients;

(5) enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the oil resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner;

(6) building an effective, independent judiciary that will uphold the rule of law and ensure equal protection under the law for all citizens of Iraq;

(7) pursuing all those who engage in violence or threaten the security of the Iraqi population, regardless of sect or political affiliation;

(8) enacting and implementing legislation that reforms the de-Ba'athification process in Iraq;

(9) conducting provincial elections in Iraq;

(10) ensuring a fair process for amending the constitution of Iraq; and

(11) expending promised funds to provide basic services and employment opportunities for all Iraqis, including a $10,000,000,000 fund for reconstruction, and ensuring that these funds reach both Sunni and Shia areas, including Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad and largely Sunni Anbar Province;

Whereas the United States Ambassador to Iraq and the Commander of Multinational Forces-Iraq should report each month to the Senate on the progress being made by Iraqis toward achieving the benchmarks specified in the preceding clause and on their own progress in achieving their missions in Iraq;

Whereas leaders in the Administration of President George W. Bush and Congress have made it clear to the Iraqi leadership that the commitment of the United States in Iraq is not open-ended and that, if the Government of Iraq does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of its own people and the people of the United States;

Whereas the moderate countries of the Middle East, and other countries around the world, have an interest in a successful conclusion to the war in Iraq and should increase their constructive assistance toward the achievement of this end;

Whereas over the past year, leaders in the Administration of President George W. Bush and Congress, as well as recognized experts outside government, acknowledged that the situation in Iraq was deteriorating and required a change in strategy; and

Whereas Lieutenant General David Petraeus has been unanimously confirmed by the Senate as the new Coalition commander in Iraq and given the mission of implementing a new strategy for Iraq designed to bring security to Iraq and pave the way for political and economic progress in Iraq: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that--

(1) Congress should ensure that General David Petraeus, the Commander of Multinational Forces-Iraq, and all United States personnel under his command, have the resources they consider necessary to carry out their mission on behalf of the United States in Iraq; and

(2) the Government of Iraq must make visible, concrete progress toward meeting the political, economic, and military benchmarks enumerated in the preamble to this Resolution.