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Iraq Rebuilding Short on Qualified Civilians
"Nobody can do much in Diyala because of the violence," Kiki Munshi said. She fears that the "window is closed."
(Courtesy Of Kiki Skagen Munshi)
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They summoned experts in postwar rebuilding, among them James Dobbins, a Rand Corp. expert in post-conflict stabilization, and John J. Hamre, a former deputy secretary of defense. Most participants embraced the civilian reserve corps idea.
Lugar did, too, and in February 2004 he introduced a bill with Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) to create the Response Readiness Corps, its mission to stand prepared "to be called upon at a moment's notice to respond to emerging international crises."
State didn't bother waiting for the legislation to pass. Four months later, then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell announced the formation of the State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (SCRS).
The job of running the SCRS was given to Carlos Pascual, a former ambassador to Ukraine. Pascual wanted to create a 200-person active-duty response corps, half of whom would be drawn from State and the rest from other parts of the federal government. They would serve in the corps for two years and then become reservists. In just four years, Pascual noted, the government would have 200 active reconstruction personnel and 400 reservists.
In addition, Pascual sought to create a 3,000-person contingent of people drawn from state and local governments and the private sector. That group was to include police officers, civil engineers and economists. And there would be a fund to hire and deploy private contractors to help with reconstruction within weeks of a crisis instead of waiting months for a special budget request, which is what State is now being forced to do.
The problem was the price tag: $350 million for the first year, Pascual and his staff figured.
The White House budget office balked. Pascual's request was whittled down to $100 million.
Congressional appropriators were even more skeptical. Republicans questioned whether the initiative was a priority for the White House. Democrats expressed concern that the reserve corps might encourage the administration to invade another country.
The appropriators chopped so much that in the end the SCRS got just $7 million in 2005. The message from Congress was clear: If State wanted to fund the corps, it would have to find the money elsewhere in its budget.
"The bureaucratic antibodies were immediately activated," said Michèle Flournoy, president of the Center for a New American Security. "The rest of the State Department tried to kill SCRS because it was a competitor for funds. It never had a chance to succeed."
Broad Support but Little Traction
In 2006, Pascual tried again. This time, he first hit resistance in his own department.
"There was this perverse cycle that began," he recalled. "The legislative staff at State would say, 'The Hill doesn't like this, therefore we shouldn't ask for much because we're not going to get it.' Then you had the Hill saying, 'The administration hasn't made this a priority so we're not going to fund it.' "
