Analysis: Shiite Protests Send Message

A man carries a poster that pictures, from left to right, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of Iraq's largest Shiite political party, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, and the most influential Shiite cleric in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, as he attends a protest in the Shiite holy city of Najaf, 160 kilometers (100 miles) south of Baghdad, Iraq, Saturday, Feb. 24, 2007. Thousands of Shiites rallied in Najaf Saturday to protest the nearly 12 hour detention of Amar al-Hakim, the eldest son of Iraq's most influential Shiite politician, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. (AP Photo/Alaa al-Marjani) (Alaa Al-marjani - AP)

Mainstream Shiite parties have no interest in making trouble now, especially since the U.S. is sending more troops to shore up the Shiite-led government. But the potential for trouble is there as American and Shiite interests diverge.

The U.S. is concerned about Shiite political ties to Iran, which the Americans say provides money and weapons _ some of which have killed Americans. The U.S. has no interest in seeing Iraq fall under Iran's domination when U.S. troops leave.

Shiite politicians have been resisting U.S. pressure to reverse regulations that exclude many Sunnis from government posts because of their past membership in Saddam Hussein's party. Shiite leaders have been stalling on a deal to consider amendments to the 2005 constitution _ a major Sunni demand.

But the Americans cannot afford to push the Shiites too hard. The Shiite parties with the closest links to Iran are also key players in a government that the United States is trying to bolster so that U.S. troops can eventually leave.

The U.S. has struggled to maintain its delicate relationship with Shiite political movements since the early days of the U.S. occupation when it began to cultivate Shiite leaders, seeing them as natural allies against Sunni religious extremists and Saddam loyalists.

The price of a pro-Shiite strategy was to alienate the Sunnis and perhaps invigorate the insurgency. But the alternative would have been worse: a two-front war.

The U.S. got a taste of that during two uprisings by anti-American Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in 2004. U.S. troops killed thousands of al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia before Shiite clerics and politicians negotiated cease-fires.

American commanders, who needed U.S. troops to fight the Sunnis, accepted the cease-fires, then looked the other way when al-Sadr's fighters simply hid their weapons to fight another day.

__

Robert H. Reid is AP correspondent-at-large and has reported frequently from Iraq since 2003.