New Strategy for War Stresses Iraqi Politics

Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of the U.S. forces in Iraq, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker are overseeing the plan. (By Gerald Herbert -- Associated Press)

"The focus has to be on abusive sectarian actors" involved in orchestrating sectarian killings and also obstructing key political legislation and financial reforms, agreed a U.S. official involved with the plan. "You will never eliminate sectarian tendencies, [so] you want to go after those who are abusive. You have to focus on setting some examples, but you need good evidence to support that," he said.

"We try to gather evidence in conjunction with the Iraqis, that convinces the Iraqis that they need to act. . . . We are not running our own death squads or vigilante activity," a senior official in Baghdad said. One officer familiar with the plan said: "For us to do it would be horrible. But for the Iraqis to do it would be hard."

Indeed, one source of pessimism about the plan is whether the Iraqi government has the means and willpower to weed out sectarian officials and commanders, in an atmosphere complicated by rumors and ambiguous intelligence.

"Very often you won't get ironclad information. Very often they cover their tracks," said Stephen Biddle, a member of the assessment team and military expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, who spoke in his capacity as an independent analyst.

While saying they are confident that the United States is making headway in improving security, several officials involved with the plan expressed doubt in the Iraqi leadership. "I have less confidence about . . . the Iraqi government and whether they will be able to modify their behavior in the time we have available because of the U.S. political cycle," a senior U.S. official in Baghdad said.

A primary element of Petraeus's strategy of placing U.S. troops with Iraqi army forces and Iraqi police in the same outposts is to monitor for sectarian abuses. The quality of evidence will determine whether the United States will pressure the Iraqi government to fire the wrongdoers -- by withholding military or economic aid or threatening to expose them in the news media -- or to target them for capture and criminal punishment.

The problem, officials said, is that the U.S. drive to make Iraqi forces independent has already limited U.S. leverage. "We've surrendered a lot of levers that we need," the senior official in Baghdad said.

Also part of the plan is reaching out to grass-roots groups such as tribes, religious leaders and provincial administrators that are moving forward on reconciliation efforts, said Kilcullen, noting a tribal agreement in Babil province last week to end violence and a tribal movement in Anbar to oppose al-Qaeda. "We should not restrict our view of what a 'political' settlement is, solely to the Iraqi government -- civil society also has a really key role to play."

Efforts at negotiated settlements brokered by U.S. and Iraqi officials will extend to a broad spectrum of Iraqi groups, including some that have killed U.S. troops -- a source of consternation for some U.S. officers. But they will exclude groups such as al-Qaeda that are considered "irreconcilable," officials said.

The plan is also designed to shore up Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, even though some U.S. commanders regard him as beholden to narrow sectarian interests. But they support Maliki for pragmatic as well as political reasons: As pressure mounts in Congress for a troop withdrawal, time lost reorganizing the government could mean losing the war, officials said.

"Maliki is the chosen vehicle; he's the one-trick pony," Dodge said in an interview from London. "Everyone recognizes that the success or failure [of U.S. policy] would be delivered through the office of the prime minister" and there is no discussion in Baghdad of removing him, he said.

The campaign plan upholds Bush's long-term goal of creating a stable and unified Iraq that is a partner against terrorism. Yet because of uncertainty over Maliki's intentions, the plan lowers medium-term expectations for reconciliation in Iraq. Instead, it aims for bargains to curb sectarian violence.

"Our notion of 'reconciliation' . . . is not necessarily where Iraqis are at right now," said Kilcullen, explaining that the word has no equivalent in Arabic. "The tribal and community leaders I talk to are more pragmatic and are looking for a compact or a settlement that brings an end to the violence. Restoring relationships is separate."

The campaign plan is being formulated by a Joint Campaign Plan Redesign Team, which includes members of the JSAT as well as other military planners and civilian officials. The final document will be signed by Petraeus and Crocker.

The plan is a thick tome with more than 20 annexes on topics such as policy on Iraqi security forces, detainees, the rule of law and regional diplomatic engagement, one participant said.