Newsview: U.S. Plan May Prompt Civil War

US soldiers stand guard in Baqouba, Iraq, 60 kilometers (35 miles) northeast of Baghdad Tuesday, July 3, 2007. The US and Iraqi forces launched an offensive in attempt to clear the town of militants. (AP Photo/Talal Mohammed) (Talal Mohammed - AP)

In rural areas, tribal loyalty is often stronger than allegiance to the national government, especially when the central administration is weak.

"There's no question that the people with guns in Iraq are looking after their own self-interest," said Jon Alterman, a Mideast expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "And they don't have any sentimental attachment to the central government in Baghdad."

Mindful of that risk, the Shiite government's initial reaction to arming Sunnis in Anbar and elsewhere was cool. Last month, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said arming Sunnis was simply creating new militias.

Later, al-Maliki said his remarks were misunderstood and that the program should be carried out "under the supervision of Iraqi authorities and through the government."

But the effort to arm the Sunnis grew in part out of U.S. frustration with Iraqi officials, notably in the Shiite-led Interior Ministry.

U.S. officers had complained privately that they had found Sunnis willing to join but the Shiites at the ministry in Baghdad would not authorize the slots.

"We've been forced to go beyond the central government because the central government's reach doesn't extend much beyond the Green Zone, and local police are often extensions of militias in any event," Alterman said. "We've been forced to cut out the middleman because there's no effective middleman to be had."

The success of the program will likely depend on whether the Iraqis make progress in reaching power sharing agreements among the Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish communities. That would reinforce a sense of national cohesion _ which the country now lacks.

Prospects for lasting agreements appear uncertain. The main Sunni political bloc has refused to attend Cabinet meetings to protest an arrest warrant against a colleague. Muqtada al-Sadr's Shiite faction has also suspended its participation in government.

Those issues would have to be resolved before meaningful agreements can be struck.

Frederick Kagan, a former West Point professor and senior analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, acknowledges that the Americans and Iraqis must be careful to ensure that the Sunnis are eventually integrated into the security forces.

But Kagan believes the gamble is worth it.

"We are serving as the bridge between the Sunni insurgents and tribal leaders and the Shia government," Kagan wrote in The Weekly Standard. "Before the end of last year, there were virtually no Sunnis willing to step on that bridge. Now, five months into the surge, tens of thousands are walking on it."

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Robert H. Reid is correspondent-at-large for The Associated Press and has frequently reported from Iraq since 2003.