Sen. Snowe's Speech on the Iraq War

These stark facts have led our top military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials in Iraq to the conclusion that the political reconciliation which the surge was meant to facilitate is not being undertaken. Last month, General Petraeus stated that conditions in Iraq will not improve sufficiently by September to justify a drawdown of U.S. military forces.

Thomas Fingar, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence and chief of the National Intelligence Council, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee last week, stated that while the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has made "limited progress on key legislation," that "scant common ground between Shias, Sunnis and Kurds continues to polarize politics." Mr. Fingar even stated that the majority Shiite bloc that Maliki heads "does not present a unified front."

Let us also consider the words of key Iraqi leaders themselves, which are even more disturbing and telling. Indeed, Iraq's foreign minister said recently that "These are not your benchmarks, these are our goals. Why do you make it yours?" This, despite the fact that American troops are selflessly risking and giving their lives to make it possible for such officials to achieve the political, economic, and security benchmarks which were agreed to in September of last year by Iraq's Political Committee on National Security and reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October 16.

So, frankly, given statements such as these, it is not a surprise that, last week, the administration issued a report--the interim report--that found that the Iraqi Government had failed to accomplish any of these political objectives the Iraqis themselves set.

Let's look at those deadlines and those goals and the track record.

In October 2006, provincial elections law, a date for provincial elections, and a new hydrocarbon law--the new oil revenue-sharing law--were supposed to be approved. But that deadline came and went.

A debaathification law and a provincial council authorities law were to be enacted in November. But that deadline came and went.

In December they were to approve a law demobilizing and disarming the militias. But that deadline came and went.

The Constitutional Review Committee was to complete its work in January, independent commissions were to be formed in February, and a constitutional amendments referendum was to be held, if required, in March. But those deadlines also came and went.

What does it suggest when a U.S. official--and actually it is incorporated in the interim report--recently observed that political reconciliation is largely trailing any advances in security--calling it a "lagging indicator"? But if the Iraqi Government were truly serious, shouldn't concrete steps toward reconciliation be the predictor--shouldn't it be a leading indicator--of an inner fortitude and intention to accomplish those benchmarks that are supposed to be happening in tandem with the surge--if the surge was designed to be that window of opportunity, to give the breathing space to the Iraqi Government to create the conditions on the ground that will allow them to make the political compromises so essential to unifying their country?

Security will only come through a belief by the Iraqis that they will have a political and economic future. That is why Iraq's fate is in the hands of the Iraqi leadership and its Government. The only way they will be able to secure their future is to be able to quell the sectarian violence, to integrate the minority population, to create power-sharing arrangements to diffuse the sectarian conflicts. In that way only can Iraq maintain its integrity as a unitary state.

So I ask, if the intelligence community assessed in February that "with the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities affecting the political scene the prospects for reconciliation are bleak"--that is the intelligence community's assessment--and General Petraeus stated in March, "there is no military solution" and that "a political resolution ..... is crucial," and the general is quoted in the Air Force Times last month saying "coun.ter.in.sur.gency is roughly ..... 80 percent political," as codified in his own coun.ter.in.sur.gency manual--and the interesting part about that is in that manual General Petraeus states that the host nation has to win it on its own, and that is exactly what the surge was all about; it was to allow them to accomplish those key political goals that would demonstrate to the Iraqi people they had a government that was representative of all the people and not just a few--and the Iraqi Government has failed to accomplish these political benchmarks that were established by their own leadership and the Government of Iraq , then doesn't it make sense to begin to choose an alternative course? Because it is difficult to see the wisdom of this current strategy without holding the Iraqis accountable, the time has come to stand up and to speak out on behalf of the American people to say that the current strategy is unacceptable and the moment has arrived to change that direction.