Sen. Snowe's Speech on the Iraq War
(July 17, 2007)

Congressional Record
Saturday, July 21, 2007 5:58 PM

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, first of all, I express my profound gratitude to my friend and colleague from Arizona, Senator McCain, the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, for his unsurpassed and exemplary leadership on so many defense and national security issues throughout his distinguished career.

I rise to speak to the monumental, consequential matter before us with regard to the future course of the United States and our courageous men and women in Iraq, and specifically to express my support and cosponsorship of the amendment that is presently before the Senate that has been authored by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Levin, and Senator Reed of Rhode Island. I thank them for their hard work and outstanding leadership on this historic matter.

I recognize that none of us arrives at this debate lightly. In my 28-year tenure in Congress, I have witnessed and participated in debates on such vital matters as Lebanon, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Indisputably, a myriad of deeply held beliefs were expressed on those pivotal matters--some in concert, some complimentary, some in conflict. Yet, without question, all were rooted in mutual concern for and love of our great Nation. Without question, that remains so today with the various proposals that are before us.

I remind my colleagues in the Senate that the framework that has been embraced in the amendment authored by Senator Levin and Senator Reed is one that is not without precedent throughout our history in the actions taken by this institution in previous conflicts. So it is not a departure from precedent but very consistent with precedent in the past. Where we make decisions to impose our imprint on a longstanding conflict is obviously of critical consequence to this Nation.

In my view, 4 1/2 years following the commencement of our military operations in Iraq , and 6 months after the troop surge was announced and was initiated, we now stand at the crossroads between help and reality with respect to the Iraqi Government's ability or even willingness to achieve national reconciliation for its own country and its own people.

The time has come to address that reality. The time has come to determine if our military and our strategy should continue on the basis of perpetually hoping the Iraqis will succeed or whether they actually possess the desire and the drive to place their national interest above their sectarian ambitions.

In my considered examination and analysis, taking into account my visits to Iraq --most recently in May--the facts and information we already have had at hand, the record of serial intransigence on the part of the Iraqi Government regarding its inability to forge the political underpinnings essential for national reconciliation, and the fact there is universal agreement that a military solution alone is not possible, I believe a dramatic and fundamental change in our strategy in Iraq is essential and that Congress must require it based on that reality.

Because while the hands of time have now advanced in what has been described as sort of the 11th hour for Iraqi political reconciliation, in fact, in many ways, I see progress has moved in a regressive fashion. We can no longer afford to place more American service men and women in harm's way to instill a peace that the Iraqis seem unwilling to seek for themselves.

I do not come to this conclusion casually or abruptly. Far from it. Indeed, following the President's address to the Nation in January, in which he unveiled a "New Way Forward in Iraq" through primarily increasing troop levels, I was among the first to publicly oppose that plan. In my view, it addressed neither the root cause of the violence in Iraq that was fueled by longstanding and deep-seated sectarian conflicts, nor the failure of the Iraqi Government to either demonstrate the will or capacity to quell that sectarian violence.

It is incumbent upon the Iraqi people and their Government to work toward their own national unity. At that juncture, when we were about to assume even greater risk on behalf of the future of Iraq , there was, frankly, no compelling evidence that the Iraqis were willing to assume similar risks for a united future that only they can truly secure.

Therefore, I then joined my colleagues Senators BIDEN, LEVIN, and HAGEL, in introducing a Senate resolution that opposed the surge and instead would have urged the President to increase our coun.ter.ter.ror.ism efforts, maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq , promote regional stability through a renewed diplomatic offensive, and continue the training of the Iraqi security forces--all without withdrawing precipitously.

I said at the time that it was essential for the

Congress to make our voices heard in a policy that has significant implications not only for our Nation and the Middle East but, indeed, the world community. I believe our bipartisan proposal would have offered a clear expression for a new strategy that would have compelled, in the words of the resolution itself, "the Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises necessary to end the violence." Unfortunately, the measure did not generate sufficient support at the time, and now we find ourselves confronting a similar situation only 6 months later.

In May, I traveled again to Iraq , where the good news was mixed and the bad news was deeply disturbing. First and foremost, I want to say our troops were performing superbly and courageously and in an extremely complex and challenging environment. I am certain every Member of this body would agree when I say the men and women fighting for this great Nation are integral members of the most professional and dedicated military the world has ever witnessed. So there is no question--no question--of our troops' heroic commitment.

Indeed, I witnessed the improved security situation, as has been mentioned many times on the floor, in Ramadi. I was part of the first congressional group to travel into downtown Ramadi and visit a joint security post. In that city, the tribal sheiks and the Iraqi forces have begun to work in conjunction with our own forces to fight a common enemy, and that common enemy is al-Qaida. We know the success, and clearly it was a model of success and cooperation. However, we also were told that what worked in Anbar might not necessarily work in the other provinces, that the threat varies from province to province, as we have already discovered. The threat varies from city to city, and the threat is multidimensional. What we have witnessed in Anbar where the "enemy of my enemy is also my enemy" does not necessarily suggest that it can apply across the board and may not be a model that can be replicated in other provinces and in other cities. Certainly, we should use it where it can work and can be applied, but certainly it may not be possible in all of the other areas within Iraq , because the common enemy within al-Anbar was, of course, al-Qaida.

So I happen to believe it is abundantly apparent that we must send a strong message to the Iraqi Government that by linking our continued strategy in Iraq to the level of progress they made in attaining the political benchmarks they themselves had agreed to were so central to securing an Iraqi Nation. After all, by the President's own account, the Baghdad Security Plan, the surge, was designed to be the final window of opportunity for the Iraqis to institute those benchmarks. They had to know it was a window we would close if they did not act with commensurate urgency.

That is why, upon my return from Iraq , I, along with my colleague, Senator Bayh from Indiana, introduced bipartisan legislation that would have required the Iraqi Government to meet the benchmarks outlined by the Iraq Study Group and the administration. If the Iraqi Government failed to do so, our bill directed that the surge forces would redeploy and the remaining forces would transition to a far more limited mission that included the training and equipping of the Iraqi forces, assisting the deployed Iraqi brigades with intelligence, transportation, air support, and logistics, protecting U.S. and coalition personnel and infrastructure, and maintaining rapid reaction teams to undertake coun.ter.ter.ror.ism missions against al-Qaida.

I argued in May that we are at a critical juncture and that we were at a point where we must be pivoting toward a policy that responsibly brings us to a resolution on the future course of America's involvement in Iraq . I believed at the time the bipartisan legislation that I introduced with Senator Bayh would place the onus and the burden rightfully where it belongs--on the Iraqi Government and its political leaders to enact and to implement the benchmarks that, again, they themselves had pledged to achieve.

Our legislation would have required General Petraeus to come before the Congress and testify 14 days following his September report and, if the political benchmarks had not been met, to submit a plan on phased redeployment of the surge troops associated with the Baghdad security plan and a change in mission for all of the troops, consistent, again, with the recommendations set forth by the Iraq Study Group report.

Senator Bayh and I crafted the bill with the intent of garnering bipartisan support and called for not a mandate but, rather, an objective of completing the transition and redeployment 6 months later--which would have been approximately the end of March 2008.

As I said at the time, we cannot further countenance political intransigence on the part of the Iraqi Government, while our men and women are on the front lines confronting sacrifices and making sacrifices each and every day. I am pleased that many elements of the Snowe-Bayh bill were included in the measure that was drafted by our esteemed colleague Senator Warner, which was incorporated into the supplemental legislation which the Senate passed on May 24 and that became law, which established the 18 benchmarks to evaluate the performance of the Iraqi Government.

Yet here we are now, nearly 2 months from the passage of that supplemental, and coming off the bloodiest 3-month period for American troops since the war began, with 331 deaths in that period, and more than 600 since the surge began. And yet, as last week's White House interim report only underscored, there still has been no significant progress on any of the political benchmarks whatsoever.

Among other failures, they have not passed an oil law which fairly divides oil revenue among Iraq's ethnicities and religious sects. Last month, the largest Sunni political grouping announced its four Cabinet ministers were boycotting the Government and were withdrawing its 44 members from the Parliament, and there was a "no confidence" vote scheduled to take place even against Prime Minister Maliki. Perhaps most incredible, given this stunning lack of progress, is the fact that the Iraqi Parliament will not be in session for the entire month of August.

That effectively means that the Iraq Parliament--even assuming--even assuming--they can attain the required quorum to conduct their affairs given that in the past 2 months, the Parliament has had considerable difficulty obtaining a quorum and has rarely had enough members in the chamber to vote--has another 3 weeks remaining in session before the month of September arrives; all the while, our soldiers continue the battle, while the Iraqi Government will take a recess, having failed to make significant progress on any of the benchmarks included in the supplemental bill we passed 2 months ago.

These stark facts have led our top military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials in Iraq to the conclusion that the political reconciliation which the surge was meant to facilitate is not being undertaken. Last month, General Petraeus stated that conditions in Iraq will not improve sufficiently by September to justify a drawdown of U.S. military forces.

Thomas Fingar, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence and chief of the National Intelligence Council, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee last week, stated that while the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has made "limited progress on key legislation," that "scant common ground between Shias, Sunnis and Kurds continues to polarize politics." Mr. Fingar even stated that the majority Shiite bloc that Maliki heads "does not present a unified front."

Let us also consider the words of key Iraqi leaders themselves, which are even more disturbing and telling. Indeed, Iraq's foreign minister said recently that "These are not your benchmarks, these are our goals. Why do you make it yours?" This, despite the fact that American troops are selflessly risking and giving their lives to make it possible for such officials to achieve the political, economic, and security benchmarks which were agreed to in September of last year by Iraq's Political Committee on National Security and reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October 16.

So, frankly, given statements such as these, it is not a surprise that, last week, the administration issued a report--the interim report--that found that the Iraqi Government had failed to accomplish any of these political objectives the Iraqis themselves set.

Let's look at those deadlines and those goals and the track record.

In October 2006, provincial elections law, a date for provincial elections, and a new hydrocarbon law--the new oil revenue-sharing law--were supposed to be approved. But that deadline came and went.

A debaathification law and a provincial council authorities law were to be enacted in November. But that deadline came and went.

In December they were to approve a law demobilizing and disarming the militias. But that deadline came and went.

The Constitutional Review Committee was to complete its work in January, independent commissions were to be formed in February, and a constitutional amendments referendum was to be held, if required, in March. But those deadlines also came and went.

What does it suggest when a U.S. official--and actually it is incorporated in the interim report--recently observed that political reconciliation is largely trailing any advances in security--calling it a "lagging indicator"? But if the Iraqi Government were truly serious, shouldn't concrete steps toward reconciliation be the predictor--shouldn't it be a leading indicator--of an inner fortitude and intention to accomplish those benchmarks that are supposed to be happening in tandem with the surge--if the surge was designed to be that window of opportunity, to give the breathing space to the Iraqi Government to create the conditions on the ground that will allow them to make the political compromises so essential to unifying their country?

Security will only come through a belief by the Iraqis that they will have a political and economic future. That is why Iraq's fate is in the hands of the Iraqi leadership and its Government. The only way they will be able to secure their future is to be able to quell the sectarian violence, to integrate the minority population, to create power-sharing arrangements to diffuse the sectarian conflicts. In that way only can Iraq maintain its integrity as a unitary state.

So I ask, if the intelligence community assessed in February that "with the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities affecting the political scene the prospects for reconciliation are bleak"--that is the intelligence community's assessment--and General Petraeus stated in March, "there is no military solution" and that "a political resolution ..... is crucial," and the general is quoted in the Air Force Times last month saying "coun.ter.in.sur.gency is roughly ..... 80 percent political," as codified in his own coun.ter.in.sur.gency manual--and the interesting part about that is in that manual General Petraeus states that the host nation has to win it on its own, and that is exactly what the surge was all about; it was to allow them to accomplish those key political goals that would demonstrate to the Iraqi people they had a government that was representative of all the people and not just a few--and the Iraqi Government has failed to accomplish these political benchmarks that were established by their own leadership and the Government of Iraq , then doesn't it make sense to begin to choose an alternative course? Because it is difficult to see the wisdom of this current strategy without holding the Iraqis accountable, the time has come to stand up and to speak out on behalf of the American people to say that the current strategy is unacceptable and the moment has arrived to change that direction.

That is why I have joined with Senators LEVIN and REED on a bipartisan basis because in my view, given the record of demonstrated inaction on the part of the Iraqi Government, we are now beyond nonbinding measures. That is what we have accomplished in the last 6 months. We considered nonbinding measures. But now we are a mere 2 months from General Petraeus's September report, with no demonstrable evidence to suggest political progress. What time is more important than now, as we consider the pending Defense authorization bill, to maximize our voice and opportunity to send an unequivocal message that if the Iraqis fail to chart a different course politically, then we will chart a different course militarily?

The fact is, America requires more than Iraq's commitment to accomplishing the benchmarks that will lead to a true national reconciliation. We must see demonstrable results. That is why we are at this critical juncture. That is the answer to why now and why wait until September.

Because given all we know, I happen to believe we cannot lose precious time in delivering an unmistakable message that the Iraqi Government must take the consensus-building measures necessary for reconciliation.

For those who characterize this bill as tantamount to a precipitous withdrawal, let me say it is neither precipitous nor a withdrawal. I urge my colleagues to read the legislation, to read the amendment that has been drafted, to actually look at the language. I think it would be worthwhile, because I have heard mischaracterizations of what this legislation would accomplish. This legislation would result in redeployment, a change in mission, and reduced forces, but it does not suggest--it does not require--a precipitous withdrawal. In fact, it does not do that. It would reduce our troops and change our mission, beginning 120 days after passage, while specifically allowing the troops to remain for critical missions such as coun.ter.in.sur.gency and attacking al-Qaida, providing force protection, as well as training the Iraqis--again, goals that are very consistent with the Iraq Study Group.

I think it is very important for Members of the Senate to read--to actually read--the language which has been incorporated in the amendment that is pending before the Senate, because it requires a very different mandate than has been described here on the floor of the Senate. It is not a precipitous withdrawal. In fact, it allows the discretion to maintain troops by the commanders in order to complete those missions as described in the amendment that would allow us to continue to train the Iraqis and to fight al-Qaida.

Some of my colleagues have also opined that this proposal will limit the President's ability to conduct the war on terror. Last week we heard the President state that we are working to defeat al-Qaida and other extremists and aid the rise of an Iraqi Government that can protect its people. Well, again, this amendment rightly does nothing to detract from that objective. In fact, as I said, the amendment defers to the commanders on the group to determine the number of troops and forces necessary to fight al-Qaida.

Specifically, the amendment empowers the Secretary of Defense to deploy and maintain members of the Armed Forces in Iraq to engage in targeted coun.ter.ter.ror.ism operations against al-Qaida, al-Qaida-affiliated groups, and other international terrorist organizations, which encompasses maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity against terrorist groups, including those backed by foreign countries. So that is the reality of the language which has been included in this amendment that is pending before the Senate--not as some have described.

Furthermore, this measure would not take effect until 120 days after the passage of this legislation--after the passage of the Defense authorization. Let me note that in the last 4 years, the earliest approval of the National Defense Authorization Act occurred on October 17. That was the earliest date in which it became law in each of the last 4 years. So this isn't rash. This is reasoned, and this is responsible. Indeed, the language crafted by Senator Hagel in the amendment also seeks to internationalize our effort by calling on the U.N. to appoint an international mediator in Iraq and that the auspices of the United Nations Security Council, which has the authority of the international community to engage political, religious, ethnic, and tribal leaders in Iraq , and include them in the political process. This mediator will seek to bridge the divide between the competing sects to bring stability to Iraq and prevent a spillover into a civil war.

The Levin-Reed amendment specifically states it shall be implemented as part of a comprehensive, diplomatic, political, and economic strategy that includes sustained engagement with Iraq's neighbors and the international community for the purposes of working collectively to bring stability to Iraq . As the Baker-Hamilton report concluded, Iraqi political accommodations can be achieved only within a constructive regional framework supported by the international community, a statement that I believe highlights the necessity now in the United States to refocus its policy, its leadership, and its resources on directly helping the Iraqis to establish an inclusive political framework to begin to diffuse the violence.

Finally, to those with concerns about the April conclusion date included in the Levin-Reed amendment, let me also point out this is not an arbitrary date the Congress imposed but, rather, it reflects the reality on the ground. The ability to maintain this large force in Iraq becomes virtually impossible because of the overall size of the Army. We cannot sustain current troop levels in Iraq indefinitely. General Peter Shoomaker, the prior Army Chief of Staff, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March that sustaining the troop increase in Iraq beyond August would be a challenge, he said. In fact, Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in April that our ground forces, the Army in particular, are "broken" or in danger of "breaking." The reality is that without significantly changing the force structure or employing a "different force mix," we must begin to redeploy.

The bottom line is this is a defining moment. It is a defining moment for America's policy in Iraq and it is a defining moment for the Senate--indeed, the entire Congress--as to whether we are now prepared to assert our legislative prerogatives and authorities that are not without precedent, as I said earlier, to direct a different course and to alter our strategy--a strategy that reality warrants and demands. The decision before us is one of grave consequence because it is a matter of war. It demands that we look past the rhetoric and the partisanship which often enshrouds and clouds many of the most significant issues of our time, and that is certainly true with respect to this war.

We expect passion to run high, but I hope it doesn't create the inability on the part of our collective wisdom and desire to do what is right and what is best for our country and for the men and women in uniform who are on the front lines each and every day performing magnificent sacrifices, as we all well know, with the loss of lives we have experienced in each of our States across this country. Frankly, if it weren't for those men and women, you know, we wouldn't be the greatest Nation on Earth, because they have woven the fabric for greatness for this country throughout the generations.

So I would hope that at this moment in time, we can rise to the occasion and that in spite of the spirited debate, we

can come together to try to resolve this major question, because that is what the American people want. That is what my constituents want in the State of Maine. They are hoping and praying we can come together and unite and to do what is right for this country at this most challenging and vexing and consequential moment in our Nation's history. I hope we can live up to the moniker of the Senate as the world's greatest deliberative body, because certainly that moment is upon us.

Thank you, Mr. President.