Southwest Pilots Receive Most Blame for '05 Crash

The pilots of a Southwest Airlines jet were primarily responsible for a 2005 crash in Chicago that killed a 6-year-old boy because they did not properly halt the plane before it skidded off a slick runway, federal investigators said yesterday.

The National Transportation Safety Board also concluded that Southwest contributed to the crash by not properly training pilots in how to handle such situations.

The crash, the first in Southwest's 36 years, occurred at Chicago's Midway International Airport during a snowstorm on Dec. 8, 2005.

After touching down, the pilots neglected to turn on the plane's thrust reversers, devices that redirect thrust to help slow down the aircraft, for 15 seconds. Investigators said that mistake made it impossible for the jet to stop before crashing through a fence and into traffic. Joshua Woods, a 6-year-old Indiana boy, was killed when the plane struck a passing car in which he was riding.

The NTSB found that the pilots delayed activating the thrust reversers because they were distracted by a braking procedure that the airline was introducing.

Investigators said yesterday that the pilots received mixed in-flight reports of their destination's runway condition as they flew from Baltimore-Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport.

Southwest Airlines' policy requires pilots to consider the worst conditions when trying to figure out whether it is safe to land. The airline's pilots are not supposed to land if runways are in poor condition and if there is a tail wind of just over 5 mph. The pilots faced such conditions in Chicago, and later told investigators that they were not aware of the restrictions, reports show.

They also made their decision to land based on calculations made by their onboard computer that showed they could stop on the runway despite poor conditions. The pilots told investigators that they did not know that their computers considered the aid of thrust reversers when calculating stopping distances. Investigators said those calculations gave the pilots a false sense of security because they thought they would get extra help from the reversers, giving them a bigger safety margin.

The board found that Southwest failed "to provide its pilots with clear and consistent guidance and training" about landing procedures, and it faulted the way the company programmed and designed the onboard computer. The airline also was criticized for not having big enough buffers for its pilots in determining whether they could land.

"The crew knew they were flying on the edge," said board member Deborah A.P. Hersman. "The problem was that they didn't know where the edge was."

Southwest spokeswoman Beth Harbin said the airline has taken steps since the crash to ensure pilots are aware of its landing policies and has improved other aspects of its operations to prevent similar errors.