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Errors Are Found In Metro Accident

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In two interviews with investigators, Harris said she hit the emergency stop button, known as a "mushroom." In one interview, Harris was asked what her understanding of the rules were when approaching track-walkers. "You're supposed to blow your horn," she said, according to the transcript. Asked what she would be required to do if the workers were on the track, in harm's way, in front of the operator, she responded: "Stop the train immediately, mushroom and blow the horn." According to the NTSB report, "the mushroom was not depressed until about 14 minutes after the train was stopped."

The new rail procedures include limiting track inspectors to rail checks from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m., when fewer trains are on the tracks. A directive in April ordered track inspectors to contact the control center by radio after they leave a station or pass an interlocking, the part of the railroad where tracks can cross each other. The control center, in turn, must repeat back to the inspector to confirm accuracy and to inform train operators in the area, until personnel clear the work zone.

According to the NTSB, the control center had not been required to advise the track inspectors killed in the Alexandria accident that a train was moving toward them. Train operators who have been notified that employees are on the track must put their trains in manual mode, instead of automatic, two stations before arriving at the work site and must travel no faster than 35 mph.

Although the operator sounded her horn twice, video from an Eisenhower station platform camera showed that the lead track-worker "showed no reaction to the train" just before the accident. Metro officials said it was possible that the workers, who were on one track, thought the train was on the opposite track and might have assumed they were safe. The NTSB said the two workers were on the northbound track, between Huntington and Eisenhower stations. The empty train would normally have been on the opposite southbound track. But because a piece of the southbound track was out of service, the train was routed against traffic on the northbound track.

During routine drug and alcohol tests for the train operator, supervisor and personnel in the control center, a control-center trainee tested positive for cocaine, the NTSB said. Metro spokeswoman Lisa Farbstein said the employee, whom she declined to identify, was employed from May 1999 to May 2007. "The controller trainee did not play any direct role in the incident," Farbstein said.

Staff researcher Meg Smith contributed to this report.


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