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Building a Solution for Burma
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Second, we have to find a way to deal with the Chinese Security Council veto. We can do this by relying more on ASEAN. The ASEAN countries are not the peripheral players in this drama that many analysts imagine. Their participation is, in fact, the key to bringing China on board in favor of effective Security Council action. The Chinese care about geopolitical advantage in ASEAN, about its resources, and about its markets. They have offered to follow ASEAN's lead on Burma. It's difficult to imagine how the Chinese could square opposition to an ASEAN-supported arms embargo and asset freeze with continued energetic courtship of the region. The real question boils down to who calls the shots in ASEAN: Will ASEAN adapt to China's concerns regarding their friends in Burma, or will ASEAN chart its own course, and insist the Chinese adapt to it?
The gathering of ASEAN leaders beginning this weekend serves as a perfect opportunity to answer that question and turn up the heat.
Then there's India, the other very prominent arms supplier to the junta. One might have hoped it would take action without coercion. It will, at any rate, be forced to abide by the Security Council embargo.
One thing to keep in mind, as debate swirls about the possibility of pressuring the Burmese generals and their likely reaction, is that the Burmese government sees value in ASEAN, if not for anything else than to balance off its biggest suitors. As Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo explained to his parliament, "Myanmar would rather remain a part of the ASEAN family than be by itself a buffer state sandwiched between two rising powers." This is a point of leverage.
Third, the U.S. and the EU must look at ways to make their sanctions relevant. The hard-line American approach is an important moral statement, but the lack of American engagement feeds cynicism about its enviable position and saps its ability to lead. Unilateral sanctions have run their course as a threat. What remains is their positive side: the vision of life in Burma where the full resources of the international community are brought to bear. The U.S. and others should make clear that it will lift sanctions and spur economic development according to a negotiated, verified transition to democracy.
World opinion is in: It cares what happens in Burma. Asia cares. A solution must be built on a clear-eyed, unsentimental assessment of the obstacles and competing interests, and a willingness to see the problem in new ways. This means deciding who the U.S. can rely on as friends and who must be squeezed into action. It means the U.S. and its allies for democracy leveraging the negative, but safe path of sanctions into a positive vision for the future that is apparent to all involved. There are no guarantees of success. But the current UN effort at engagement has set the baseline. It has failed. It is time for a new approach.
The author is director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation (heritage.org).


