For Giuliani, the Trip South Started Early

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The Candidates React-- Rudy Giuliani

Presidential candidate former mayor Rudy Giuliani (R-N.Y.) addresses his supporters after the Florida primary election results filter in.

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Pat Robertson's endorsement of Giuliani had done nothing to assuage the antipathy of social conservatives for the New Yorker's positions on abortion rights and gay rights. In the southwest town of Creston, Iowa, state Sen. Jeff Angelo, an evangelical Christian who was a Giuliani supporter despite their differences on key social issues, had been shocked along with other Giuliani volunteers by the intensity of the opposition to his candidate.

"We were actually in second place in some polls, behind Romney, in the early summer," Angelo said. "And we had Robertson, which I thought would have a big value. But everybody rebuffed Robertson. It was like they said, 'We have to stop this, stop him.' "

A congressional supporter of Giuliani remembers hearing from amazed Giuliani volunteers about people asking them at Iowa rallies how it felt to be aiding "baby killers." But a stunned Angelo hadn't given up, hoping that evangelicals -- who constituted about 60 percent of the caucus electorate -- might still be swayed by an account of Giuliani's fiscal conservatism and mayoral performance, especially if they could meet him. He lobbied the national campaign to allocate more time for Giuliani to show up at events, shake hands and make small talk.

New York was slow to react, and sometimes blundered when it did. An event at a farm in the eastern Iowa town of Olin was abruptly canceled when the national campaign learned that the owners, Jerry and Deborah Von Sprecken, had only a roughly 80-acre spread and were not wealthy enough to be affected by an issue Giuliani had hoped to push: the elimination of the inheritance tax. The campaign's new problem was that about half of Olin's 600 residents were planning to attend the event, scheduled for the next day. The cancellation was an embarrassment for the Von Spreckens and a public relations headache for the campaign, the subject of local newspaper articles.

Without fanfare, Giuliani called the Von Spreckens, apologized, then changed his schedule to fly to Iowa from the South, apologize in person to the couple at their home, and spend the next 2 1/2 hours chatting with them.

But Giuliani forged a connection with few Iowans, and, by the September meeting at the Marriott, it was clear that the state was lost. Goeas pulled out his sheaf of Iowa poll numbers. They were devastating, reflecting in part what the campaign termed "pro-life deal-breakers" for whom a pro-choice candidate such as Giuliani was unacceptable. The Giuliani team concluded that the campaign could spend $3 million to $4 million in Iowa and still not finish any higher than fourth. Without dissent, the strategists decided to stop making any real effort, or significant expenditures, in Iowa.

Nearly Absent in New Hampshire

New Hampshire was supposed to be different. All along, supporters in the state believed that Giuliani had a chance to do well there. Surveys by various state pollsters unaffiliated with any campaign indicated that the very social positions that had made Giuliani anathema to blocs of Republicans in other parts of the country made him ideological kin both to segments of New Hampshire Republicans with a libertarian bent and to moderate independents who could vote in the state's open GOP primary.

"Giuliani could've walked through New Hampshire had he campaigned hard here," says pollster Andy Smith of the University of New Hampshire. "He had better name recognition here at the beginning than his opponents. He had a tough position on taxes. He was what New Hampshire Republicans like. But he wasn't coming here enough. People started talking about it."

Boosters, including state Chairman Wayne Semprini, spent much of last year urging the national campaign staff to have Giuliani spend more time in New Hampshire. "We couldn't get Rudy for a lot of prime-time evening things and breakfasts because the New York people were telling us he had to fundraise for what they called a 'national' campaign," the volunteer recalls. "He'd do a fundraising breakfast out of state, come in here for an event, then fly out and do a dinner fundraiser somewhere."

Giuliani was sometimes going as long as about a month between visits.

A high-ranking official on the candidate's national staff doesn't dispute the emphasis on a national strategy or the heavy time allocated to fundraising. "I understand the grievances coming from people on the ground in New Hampshire, but we thought we had to do what he did," the official said. "They'll probably be some Monday morning quarterback now. But we couldn't self-finance a campaign like Romney could. And we weren't going to do the other extreme and just camp out in New Hampshire like John McCain did. . . . McCain did it that way because he didn't have a choice."

As late as September, it looked as though Giuliani could take New Hampshire votes from the badly wounded McCain, who had yet to recover from his summertime staff implosion and financial woes. Maybe with some hard work, the team thought, Giuliani could seize the No. 2 spot in the state and then challenge Romney by the time winter rolled around.