Evolution Of a U.S. General In Iraq

Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, until this week the No. 2 U.S. commander in Iraq, met with tribal leaders in the village of Quarghuli south of Baghdad in October to thank the local citizens who were securing the restive area. (By Maya Alleruzzo -- Associated Press)

Odierno also promoted the forging of alliances with Sunni tribesmen and the formation of U.S.-backed groups known as "concerned local citizens," his aides said.

"We thought about a spot here and a spot here," McDonald said. "He said: 'This looks good. Why don't we figure out how to get this across the force?'

"He saw quickly that this should be much bigger," McDonald said.

A native of a town of 6,000 in New Jersey, Odierno said he found the Sunni tribesmen to be similar to the cops of his childhood: They might not join the military, but they would protect their own neighborhoods.

And Odierno, who was accused in 2003 of failing to understand Iraqi culture, also repeatedly emphasized that the program, which now includes more than 80,000 men, would never work if it were imposed by the U.S. military.

"It's clear now that we can't succeed without the support of the Iraqi people," he said.

Striking a Balance

Some military officials say that Odierno has mainly been following the instructions of Petraeus, who wrote the Army's counterinsurgency manual.

"Odierno is just following his lead," said one official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to avoid possible retribution.

Petraeus disagrees. In an interview, he said that when he visited Odierno in 2006, it was clear that he understood that they were no longer fighting a conventional war.

"There was no question at that time that he and his staff and subordinate leaders absolutely understood the principles that we had all come to accept as necessary for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations," Petraeus said.

He said the whole military has had to adapt to the war. "All of us learned enormously throughout our first deployments in Iraq," he said. "Some of those lessons were learned the hard way."

Odierno prefers not to talk about specific mistakes from his time with the 4th Infantry Division from 2003 to 2004. He said his unit did the best it could during very difficult conditions with limited tools.

But he said it was undeniable that his tactics and focus had shifted since then.

"There is this balance," he said. "You've got to strike this balance of lethal and nonlethal. It's hard to determine what that balance is, but I've learned a little bit. . . . You clearly in some cases have to understand who you have to be lethal against and where you can do engagement.

"This time," he continued, "we understood them a bit better."

Staff writers Josh White and Thomas E. Ricks in Washington contributed to this report.