Hearts and Minds on the Durand Line

A Tribal Fund for the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Is Critical to Winning the War on Terror

The United States has counterterrorism operations in places all over the world -- but not in Pakistan, the center of world terrorism. Last month, Defense Secretary Robert Gates made an offer: "We remain ready, willing and able to assist the Pakistanis and to partner with them, to provide additional training, to conduct joint operations, should they desire to do so." Within hours, fearing a backlash on Pakistani soil, President Pervez Musharraf rejected the American offer.

But there is another counterterrorism strategy option for Pakistan: Empower millions of oppressed people who live there to be native allies against the insurgents, through the establishment of a Global Tribal Fund.

We cannot win the war on terrorism when we are losing the border to insurgents. The heart of the Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgency is in Balochistan, the Northwest Frontier Province and the tribal belt along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, known as the Durand Line. Top al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists -- Osama bin Laden, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, Muhammad Omar, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar -- are believed to be operating from there. They are conducting military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They are using the radio to spread propaganda against the West. And, most disturbing, they are using the border to set up camps, to recruit volunteers from the tribal population and to train them to build up their operations.

Pakistan cannot tackle the insurgents alone. These harsh mountainous areas have never been controlled or conquered by military forces. Aerial bombing raids by the Pakistani military to fight the insurgency only alienate the populace as civilians are killed and villages destroyed.

An effective counterterrorism strategy requires a global ground response to forge a cooperative relationship with the tribes that harbor the insurgents and the Frontier Corps responsible for border security. We need to offer them more than the insurgency is offering.

The 60 major tribes in the Northwest Frontier province and the tribal belt -- 77 additional tribes are in Balochistan -- are clustered along the 1,600-mile border. In each of these tribes, the chiefs are the decision-makers and have the power. A friend of mine living in Kabul told me, "You could walk up and down the border if you knew the tribal chiefs; they would welcome and protect you."

The Pashtuns have a tribal code known as Pashtunwali that demands hospitality. But the tribesmen and women living among the jagged mountains are terribly oppressed. This is a poor frontier: Millions are without access to health care, clean water, education and jobs. In Balochistan, with a population of 10 million, there is one doctor for every 8,000 people. The people have no voice to the outside world; foreign journalists are banned from the area.

The links between poverty and terrorism are not hard and fast, but no one would dispute the argument that people are more vulnerable to extremist rhetoric when their needs aren't met. To counter the insurgency, we need more than military measures -- we need to improve the lives of those who live in the region.

That's why I would urge establishment of a Global Tribal Fund to raise money from around the world and direct funding into a three-pronged strategy consisting of:

1. Tribal Scouts: a coalition of locally recruited tribesmen and tribeswomen who would begin to contact and negotiate with the tribes in the border areas. The scouts would meet with chiefs to find out what they need for their people. The Pashtun and Balochi people have come together before in jirgas, or councils, to unite their tribes. Can areas of agreement be negotiated with some of their leaders? This would allow inroads to an area now inaccessible.

2. Tribal Life Support. This would include provision of water, roads, transportation, health care, education, employment opportunities and security to live and work. A major investment in infrastructure -- starting with building roads -- would need to be made. We should provide an infusion of trained Pashto- and Balochi-speaking administrators, builders, designers, health-care providers and educators to jump-start this program.

3. Tribal Security Training, for the Frontier Corps -- the paramilitary force consisting of close to 85,000 locally recruited tribesmen who know the language, the tribes and the culture and are the logical security forces. Right now they are poorly supported and funded. Training, equipment, financial resources and compensation should be provided so that they can resist domination by the insurgency.

This three-pronged strategy won't be easy, and it raises many questions: How would it go over with the Pakistani government? How would tribesmen be recruited for the tribal scouts? Would the security environment allow for this engagement?

But the need is urgent. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have resurrected themselves in Pakistan's border region and are stronger than ever. Unless we help the local population, these organizations will continue to erode the stability of both Pakistan and Afghanistan, no matter how many forces and military measures we use.

To defeat extremism, we need a global response -- an independent public and private partnership aimed at improving the lives of the people in the region. We need native, on-the-ground, face-to-face negotiations. We need to switch our ideology from winning the war to winning the border.

The writer worked at the U.S. mission to the United Nations during the Clinton administration.