In U.S., Much Interest in Pakistani Election but Few Options

Terrorist attacks, civil upheaval and a parliamentary election today that will probably shape the battle against radical extremism have moved Pakistan to the hottest of front burners within the Bush administration.

Nearly every week since November, the White House has received detailed intelligence briefings -- known as "deep dives" -- on everything from President Pervez Musharraf's struggle to retain power to the minutiae of the Pakistani army's search for al-Qaeda members in the country's western mountains. President Bush has chaired numerous national security meetings and Vice President Cheney sends a stream of queries to his underlings.

Top U.S. military, diplomatic and intelligence officials, including Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, CIA Director Michael V. Hayden and the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, Adm. Michael G. Mullen, have traveled to Islamabad in recent weeks, seeking to tighten the bilateral embrace.

"If you said there were A, B, C and D leagues of diplomatic and security engagement," one high-ranking official said, "this is A league."

Yet despite intense efforts to anticipate and direct events, the administration has no clear idea of what the immediate post-election future will bring, few ways of influencing it and a policy that amounts over the short term to little more than crossing one's fingers and hoping for the best.

There are fears that Musharraf and the waning political forces that support him will try to rig today's vote, which could provoke a violent backlash. While Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, Musharraf's handpicked successor as armed forces chief of staff, has pledged that the military will be subordinate to a new civilian government, there is no way to predict the army's response to violence. But for now, the administration sees little choice but to see what happens.

When Assistant Secretary of State Richard A. Boucher was pressed recently by lawmakers for a "Plan B," beyond advocating electoral fairness and transparency, he had little to offer. Various scenarios had been gamed out, Boucher told a House oversight hearing late last month: "Until you see the actual situation, it's very hard to decide precisely how to deal with it."

He continued: "Exactly what we would do, in the case of widespread violence after the election, would really depend on what it was and where it came from. If it were ignited by the militants, there's a chance that we could work and see the society band together. But if it were the result of electoral fraud, that, obviously, creates a much more complicated situation." It is "a real possibility," he said, but "I don't think I'm really able to give you a clear answer right now as to exactly what we would do."

It was not at all certain that Election Day would even arrive, given Pakistan's rocky and deteriorating path over the past several months -- bombs exploding in the cities, Musharraf's firing of many Supreme Court justices and suspension of the constitution, and the assassination of political leader Benazir Bhutto.

"Every time I say something about 'after February 18,' " said a senior State Department official, "one of my experts says, 'if we get to February 18.' You can just never underestimate the chance of something terrible happening in Pakistan."

U.S. inability to influence events has left policy in "suspended animation," said a counterterrorism official. Another official said: "I wouldn't want to call it a glide path, but there's some element of truth in that." They were among a half-dozen senior officials interviewed for this article across the government's national security branches -- none of whom was authorized to discuss the sensitive issue on the record.

Political upheaval has exacerbated long-standing anxiety over the strength and determination of Pakistan's pursuit of al-Qaeda in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghan border. Suspicions persist that the Pakistani intelligence service, a Taliban patron before U.S. forces overthrew the Islamist government in Kabul in 2001, continues to protect the Taliban's exiled leadership and to facilitate its resurgent operations across the border into Afghanistan.