Q&A: Obama on Foreign Policy

Q. You have said you would close the military prison at Guantanamo. What would you do with the prisoners there? Would you try them in civilian courts?

A. I have been disappointed that the only conviction at Guantanamo to date has been a guilty plea of material support for terrorism -- a plea that led to a nine-month sentence. I believe that our civilian courts or our traditional system of military courts-martial can administer justice more quickly while also demonstrating our commitment to the rule of law.

Q. Your call to act on "actionable intelligence about high value terrorist targets" appears identical to current administration policy. Yet the problem seems to be less a willingness to act than the availability of "actionable intelligence." Do you advocate increasing that presence in Pakistan, regardless of whether the Pakistani government agrees? What type of increased U.S. presence would you like to see in both Pakistan and Afghanistan?

A. The problem goes beyond developing actionable intelligence. It is acting on it. The failure to focus on Afghanistan and the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan] because our resources were diverted to Iraq has enabled al-Qaeda to develop a sanctuary for its core leadership, likely including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.

The Bush administration has not acted aggressively enough to go after al-Qaeda's leadership. In 2002, their failure to use U.S. troops in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan allowed al-Qaeda's leadership to cross the border to Pakistan. The New York Times reported that in early 2005 an opportunity was missed to strike an al-Qaeda leadership meeting -- reportedly including Ayman al-Zawahiri. According to the Times, this decision, "frustrated some top intelligence officials and members of the military's secret Special Operations units, who say the United States missed a significant opportunity to try to capture senior members of Al Qaeda." Furthermore, the administration itself acknowledged that the strategy of working through Pakistani tribes to capture al-Qaeda leaders had failed.

As president, I would send at least two additional combat brigades to Afghanistan. I would focus more Special Operations resources along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, including intelligence-gathering assets. I would condition some military assistance to Pakistan on their action in the FATA. And I would be clear that if Pakistan cannot or will not take out al-Qaeda leadership when we have actionable intelligence about their whereabouts, we will act to protect the American people. There can be no safe haven for al-Qaeda terrorists who killed thousands of Americans and threaten our homeland today.

Q. How would you balance the perhaps conflicting imperatives of taking U.S. action against presumed terrorists in the Pakistan border area and the possibility that such action could further undermine the ability of . . . the Pakistani government . . . in its own fight against domestic terrorism? You have called for a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq "on to the right battlefield in Afghanistan and Pakistan." How, specifically, would you change current U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan?

A. I will deploy at least two additional combat brigades to Afghanistan to reinforce our counterterrorism operations and support NATO's efforts against the Taliban. I will put more of an Afghan face on security by enhancing the training and equipping of the Afghan army and police, including more Afghan soldiers in U.S. and NATO operations. I would increase our nonmilitary aid by $1 billion to fund projects at the local level that impact ordinary Afghans -- including the development of alternative livelihoods for poppy farmers. And I will put tough anti-corruption safeguards on aid, and increase international support for the rule of law across the country.

In Pakistan, I will reject the false choice between stability and democracy. In our unconditional support for [Pakistani President Pervez] Musharraf, we have gotten neither. I will condition elements of our aid to the Pakistani government on their actions to pursue al-Qaeda in the FATA, and their actions to fully restore democracy and the rule of law. I will increase assistance for secular education and for development of the border region so that we meet the extremists' program of hate with a program of hope. Our goal in Pakistan must not just be an ally -- it must be a democratic ally, because that will be a better ally in the fight against terrorism and that will represent a better future for the Pakistani people.

Q. In implementing your plan to immediately begin withdrawing U.S. combat forces from Iraq and to complete the process within 16 months, what weight will you give to the counsel of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] commander, the combatant commander on the ground in Iraq and current intelligence chiefs on the ground in Iraq regarding an immediate phased withdrawal?

A. I will give their counsel great weight. But, as commander in chief, it is my responsibility to make my own assessment of the situation. We must send a clear signal to the Iraqi political leadership that we are leaving Iraq on a timeline. Doing so will put pressure on those leaders to begin to resolve the political impasse at the heart of this civil war.

But I also want to be clear about another thing. I am worried our Army is overstretched and that we have asked an awful lot from our military families. Many in our senior military leadership are worried about a plan that will keep 130,000 troops on the ground in Iraq for the foreseeable future. So, as commander in chief, I will also have to take into consideration the counsel of other senior military leaders who may be concerned that Iraq is undercutting our ability to confront other security challenges.