Basra Assault Exposed U.S., Iraqi Limits

By distancing himself from Maliki's government, which is widely seen as sectarian, inefficient and corrupt, Sadr apparently hopes to bolster his credentials as an Iraqi nationalist.

Last August, following clashes between Mahdi Army and Iraqi forces in the Shiite holy city of Karbala, Sadr imposed a unilateral cease-fire, largely to improve his movement's image and rebuild his militia into a disciplined force. Many observers see the cease-fire as a key reason for the recent drop in violence.

But Iraqi security forces, whose leaders are widely believed to be members of the Supreme Council and, less so, Dawa, have been detaining hundreds of Sadr's followers, prompting allegations of torture and other abuses.

Senior Sadr leaders have said their rivals have taken advantage of the cease-fire to weaken Sadr's movement ahead of provincial elections expected this year.

In interviews, senior advisers to Maliki and Hakim insisted that the Basra offensive was intended to combat criminal gangs and oil smugglers. Jalal al-Din al-Saghir, a senior Supreme Council official, said the government had not targeted Sadr.

"The forces which Maliki sent to Basra were not the type or size needed for city fighting, to confront Sadr," Saghir said.

Other lawmakers said Maliki had to know the offensive would be seen as a political maneuver. "He wanted to create a victory for himself," Othman said. "Maybe the Americans encouraged him."

Shiite lawmaker Basem Sharif, a member of the Fadhila Party, which has strong support in Basra, said he does not question the government's authority to pursue outlaws. But he said Maliki failed to shore up support in parliament before sending troops into Basra.

"Every big military operation should be based on a political base so the military operation will succeed," Sharif said.

Crocker himself was informed four days before the offensive began and received an impression of the operation's scope that differed from what transpired.

"I had the understanding this was going to be an effort to kind of get down, show they were serious with additional forces, put the squeeze on, develop a full picture of conditions and then act accordingly," Crocker said. "I was not expecting, frankly, a major battle from Day One. But then again it's not clear to me that they'd decided that's what they were going to do. The enemy has a vote in combat."

Sadiq al-Rikabi, a top political adviser to Maliki, defended the prime minister's handling of the Basra operation, while acknowledging that it "did not work as well" as expected.