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Bush Listens Closely To His Man in Iraq
Historically, a Departure

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Bush's relationship with Petraeus marks a departure for modern war presidencies. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson, George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton left it largely to their military advisers in Washington to communicate with field commanders, according to scholars of civilian-military relations.
During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, for instance, then-Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin L. Powell established himself as the sole broker between George H.W. Bush and the field commander, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf. Similarly, during the war in Kosovo, retired Army Gen. Wesley K. Clark, former supreme commander of NATO, reports that he worked through Clinton aides and Defense Secretary William S. Cohen; when Clark came to the White House to brief officials about his war strategy in 1998, he spoke with national security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger, not the president.
But during the George W. Bush administration, improved videoconferencing technology has allowed the president to communicate to an unprecedented degree with commanders on the battlefield and, his advisers say, immerse himself in the details of the war. Bush has also held videoconferences with Casey and other previous Iraq commanders, but after Petraeus and Crocker were appointed last year, the process was institutionalized in a regular Monday morning war council between Washington and Baghdad. (A similar Afghanistan meeting takes place every two to three weeks, a White House spokesman said.)
Before Petraeus took over as head of Multi-National Force-Iraq in early 2007, he had had little interaction with Bush. Indeed, after his stints as commander of the 101st Airborne Division and as head of U.S. training efforts in Iraq won much media attention, the White House initially had reservations about tapping Petraeus for the top spot in Baghdad, a move suggested by Rumsfeld, among others.
But according to current and former administration officials, Bush thought that the war effort needed shaking up and that Petraeus, a West Point graduate and Princeton PhD widely considered one of the smartest officers of his generation, might prove an effective communicator with the public and the White House.
Indeed, those who have witnessed the Monday videoconferences describe Petraeus as a gifted briefer who moves beyond the dry recitation of the metrics of battle -- enemy killed and captured -- to describe how military developments interact with political ones. "He tees up issues that are ripe for decision-making, as opposed to going through the charts," said one person familiar with the sessions.
Bush, sitting in the White House Situation Room, often takes the lead on political issues, such as dealings with Iran or Iraqi politics. But officials said he is deferential to Petraeus on military matters. The president "sets the goals," Gates said. "He expects the military professional to handle the mission."
While Bush and Petraeus are said to have bonded over their love of exercise, administration officials describe their relationship as more professional than friendly. "You have a field commander and you have the president of the United States," Gates said. "They aren't backslapping buddies."
Still, the weekly sessions provide Petraeus a rare opportunity to present his ideas to the president and to work out problems trapped in interagency conflicts. Bush, meanwhile, can speak directly to his field general, get a real-time portrait of conditions on the ground and signal priorities to the full chain of command, including Gates, Mullen and the Centcom commander, all of whom are usually on the video with Petraeus and Crocker.
"It is a strange command relationship," observed Stephen D. Biddle, a military expert at the Council on Foreign Relations who has advised Petraeus in Iraq. While it has worked well in some ways, he said, "it creates the potential for a fair amount of mischief."
'A Confluence of Interests'
Such mischief may have been on display last year, when Petraeus outmaneuvered Fallon for the president's ear on Iraq strategy. People familiar with the tension said Fallon was an early skeptic of the troop buildup and wanted U.S. engagement to end more quickly -- but found himself the odd man out when it became clear that Bush favored Petraeus's view.
Military officials said Fallon was known to refer to Petraeus and other commanders in Iraq as "the boys" in Baghdad, with whom he differed over military planning and the scale and pace of the drawdown. Fallon and other top military officials have also voiced their concerns to Congress, in public testimony and behind closed doors.


