The Bottom Is Up Ahead
You'd think that Wall Street would be feeling embarrassed and humiliated enough about its own performance that its top executives and strategists would have the good sense not to be out there peddling fresh nonsense about how the credit-market crisis has pretty much played itself out.
Don't be fooled by the latest sucker rally on stock markets or predictions that the "worst may be behind us." The first thing you need to remember is that these guys still don't have a handle on what they're dealing with -- nobody does. And even if they did, we know that when it comes to their own balance sheets, or to the outlook for the markets and the economy or designing a new regulatory framework, they simply cannot be trusted.
To figure out where things are in this crisis, and where they are headed, it's important to understand how we got in this mess. Let me posit two possibilities.
One explanation is that we got here because mortgage bankers and brokers were sleazy, investment bankers were greedy for fees, banks were incompetent, rating agencies were compromised, and regulators either were blinded by deregulatory ideology or chose to look the other way.
Obviously, there is a good deal of truth in all of that. And if you accept that as the basic story, then you might well think that the crisis will be over as soon as the bad loans are acknowledged and written off, the banks are recapitalized, and new rules are put in place to make sure it never happens again.
But what if that isn't the whole story? What if, for the better part of a decade, the United States had been living way beyond its means, consuming more than it produced and investing more than it saved? What if China and Taiwan and Saudi Arabia and even Japan were willing to finance that trade deficit on easy terms because it allowed them to peg their currencies to the dollar in a way that generated higher job creation and economic growth in their home markets? And what if this mutually advantageous imbalance in trade and investment flows wound up creating a huge supply of cheap dollar-denominated credit that virtually invited the bankers and brokers and rating agencies and private-equity firms in U.S. markets to throw caution to the wind and make ill-advised lending and investing decisions?
Not only is this a plausible explanation, but I think it is the underlying story. And if that is the case -- if the story of the credit bubble and its bursting is more fundamentally about macroeconomic imbalances than microeconomic failures -- that has very different implications for where we go from here.
For what it means is that things won't be "fixed" simply by having the financial sector write off its losses and bad loans and promise to do a better job next time with risk management. Rather, it will require a reduction in the overall standard of living in the United States so that the country as a whole begins to live within its means.
What does that mean exactly?
In practical terms, it means that households will have to reduce consumption, increase savings and stop piling up credit card debt or using home equity as an ATM.
It means that the federal government stops running huge operating deficits by raising taxes or dramatically cutting national security and entitlement spending.
It means that the price of homes return to levels that reflect the incomes of the people who live in them, and the price of office buildings and shopping centers reflect the cash flow from tenants.