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Calm in Basra May Offer A Guide for Iraqi Security


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But Basra's sudden transformation, from a city under the control of fundamentalist militias to one in which simple freedoms like playing music can be enjoyed again, has brought praise for the Iraqi army. In interviews across the city, Basrans also expressed anger at the British, who steadily slashed their forces from a high of 43,000 in 2003 to a current level of 4,000. In December, they handed over control of Basra province to Iraq and are now based at the airport miles outside the city center, along with some U.S. military advisers.
Many Basrans believe the British did not take a forceful stand against the militias because they were wary of high casualty counts in a war that is unpopular in Britain.
"The presence of the British forces in Basra was a tragedy," said Ayad al-Kanaan, a tribal leader in the city's Tannouma enclave, once a stronghold of the Mahdi Army. "We believed there was a deal between the British and the militias: 'Don't attack us. And we won't chase you.' "
In al-Andalus Park, Abdul Ridha Ali, 55, was strolling between swings and slides with his daughter, an action he had been too afraid to take under British control. Then, militiamen routinely patrolled the park and attacked anyone they deemed un-Islamic.
"The British didn't understand us," Ali said. "Iraqis know their ground, their neighborhoods, their people. The government is from our people."
British military officials acknowledge they were not successful in ridding Basra of the militias and criminal groups. But they said they played a significant role in training Iraqi troops to take over security responsibilities.
"Ultimately, the problem of the militia groups in Iraq will require a political, not a military, solution," Lt. Col. Nick Turner, a British military spokesman, wrote in an e-mail.
Dayni's convoy of Humvees proceeded to a market in the center of Five Miles. He got out and walked without a bulletproof jacket past stalls, stopping to chat with shopkeepers. He asked about their lives, their businesses. He joked with children. One shopkeeper approached him and told him that several shops down the road had been damaged during the offensive.
"When are we going to be compensated?" the shopkeeper demanded.
Dayni smiled, and cupped his fingers and thumb together in an Iraqi gesture that signifies patience. "I'll do my best for you," Dayni said, avoiding confrontation.
Earlier that morning, Dayni and his soldiers solved a dispute between two groups of young men by using traditional Iraqi tribal negotiation. "If it happened before we were in Basra, there would have been rivers of blood," Dayni said.
His soldiers surrounded him, heavily armed. One carried a rocket-propelled grenade launcher on his shoulder. But for many of the vendors, the show of force bolstered confidence. "Believe me, we are satisfied and comfortable as long as you are here," another shopkeeper told Dayni.





