Afghan Escalation

Every year, the number of troops grows -- and so do enemy attacks.

EACH YEAR since 2002, the number of U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan has grown. And each year, during the "fighting season" of spring and summer, the number of attacks by the Taliban has also increased, prompting commanders to conclude that still more troops are needed. This year is no exception. There are 66,000 foreign troops from 40 countries in Afghanistan, including 37,500 Americans; the force under NATO command has grown by 20,000 in 18 months. But Taliban attacks are up 40 percent in eastern provinces this year compared with 2007, and there has been another spike in coalition casualties. In May and June, more Western soldiers died in Afghanistan than in Iraq. Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says that "at least" three additional brigades, or about 10,500 more troops, are needed for combat operations and training of the Afghan army.

Will the escalation never end? The war in Afghanistan sometimes appears to suffer from a syndrome that also plagued the United States in Vietnam: incremental increases in troops that are never enough to turn the situation around. Had former defense secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld deployed 60,000 troops in 2002 -- rather than 5,000 -- Afghanistan might have been pacified. Now it seems that a "surge" of troops, like that successfully applied to Iraq last year, might be needed to turn the tide of the war.

The problem is that large numbers of fresh troops are unavailable. The U.S. military currently lacks the reserves, and NATO nations can't or won't provide them. Germany, Britain and France have recently pledged more soldiers, but the numbers are relatively small.

U.S. commanders point out that the increases in attacks and casualties this year result in part from the advance of coalition and Afghan army forces into areas that previously were ceded to the Taliban. Each attempt by the enemy forces to seize an area, such as a Taliban move into a cluster of villages near Kandahar last month, results in a lopsided military victory for NATO. But the Taliban gains by fomenting a sense of insecurity that prevents reconstruction -- its forces have attacked 43 schools in eastern Afghanistan since classes began in March -- and by inflicting casualties that prompt disillusionment and pressure for withdrawal in NATO capitals.

The Taliban can also afford to lose battle after battle because its main bases and top commanders are mostly across the border in Pakistan, where NATO and Afghan troops cannot follow them. Since the Pakistani army struck a de facto truce with several Pakistani Taliban leaders in February, those bases have grown stronger. So even another increase in U.S. troops -- which President Bush and both presidential candidates have promised for next year -- won't be effective unless the Taliban's own ability to escalate from Pakistan can be disrupted. If the cycle of incremental increases continues, Afghanistan within a year or two will have more Western soldiers and more casualties than Iraq. In that case, the divisive debate in Washington over whether the mission is worth the cost could migrate to that theater, as well.