Missteps Show Growing Pains as Agency Tries to Evolve Into Elite Force
By Mary Beth Sheridan
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, July 9, 2008
Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the U.S. Capitol Police have tried to become a premier anti-terrorism force, rapidly expanding as the agency's budget tripled. But a series of recent mistakes has highlighted the difficulties of changing a force once made up of glorified security guards.
The gaffes seem stunning for a department that protects the nation's most powerful lawmakers: One-quarter of the newest batch of recruits was hired despite failing criminal checks and other employment criteria; a team of officers overlooked a crude bomb in a truck; and the police radio system keeps breaking down.
The problems reflect the growing pains of a force that has struggled to adapt to a new, urgent level of threat. The Capitol Police grew out of a corps of untrained security guards, many of them college students, appointed by members of Congress. Under former chief Terrance W. Gainer, who took over in 2002, the department added about 400 officers, bringing it near its current total of 1,600. It also developed sophisticated intelligence, as well as hazmat and other units.
Yet congressional and police officials point to lingering weaknesses on management issues, and a Senate committee will hold a hearing next week on the problems.
Although Gainer was a popular "cop's cop" who elevated the abilities of the force, its administrative side lagged, according to congressional officials. The Capitol Police had no standard financial statements, poor procurement controls, critical shortages of civilian personnel and inadequate hiring policies, according to reports in recent years by the Government Accountability Office.
"There was a hyper-focus on bringing in bodies and money and no focus on accountability," said Salley Collins, a spokeswoman for the Republican staff on the House Administration Committee. "Management didn't keep up with the growth of the department."
Gainer, who left the job in 2006 and is now Senate sergeant-at-arms, disagreed.
"There's been a lot of accountability," he said. "To the extent that the administrative side has continued to struggle, that's what happens when you grow a business quickly."
Gainer inherited a department that did not even control its own budget and payroll functions, a reflection of the old congressional patronage system. That changed only in recent years.
"Half of the department was owned by the Senate, half of the department was owned by the House," Gainer said. "It's just not the way you would build a modern department."
Building the force was further complicated by constant high-profile incidents at the Capitol in the past few years, including terror threats, evacuations and elaborate presidential funerals involving hundreds of officers.
"Everyone has been wanting to blow up that Capitol since 9/11, and it hasn't occurred. Those men and women have prevented it," Gainer said.
In May, a GAO report noted "significant progress" by Gainer's successor, Chief Phillip D. Morse, in cleaning up the department's administrative side. Within weeks, however, Capitol Police pulled 15 recruits out of a training course in Georgia after discovering a major blunder: The officers had been hired even though they failed to meet employment criteria, including psychological exams and criminal checks.
The department's human resources director, Jennifer McCarthy, was placed on leave, and the recruits were told that they would be terminated. They have all appealed. Morse said in an interview that he could not discuss the cases in detail because they were under review.
"The processes and protocols we had in place were strong" in the human resources department, he said. "They didn't work here because they weren't followed. I want to stress this is isolated."
The Senate Rules Committee has said it will hold a hearing on the issues July 16. Gainer, who helps oversee the Capitol Police, and key legislators have stood by Morse.
"We think he's made significant improvements," Collins said. "We're not where we need to be administratively and technologically, but we're moving in the right direction."
Transforming the Capitol Police into an anti-terrorism force is particularly difficult because of the nature of their work, say current and former police officials. The department is a hybrid force, with many officers performing tasks similar to those of security guards -- checking briefcases, giving directions to tourists -- and others focusing on intelligence or bomb-defusing activities.
The department is as big as Cleveland's police force, but officers work at a 276-acre complex, where they get much less experience handling crime. And yet they must be ready for danger at any time. In 1998, a man with a history of mental illness stormed past a metal detector and killed two officers, a tragedy that shook up the department and accelerated its transformation.
Still, supervisory leadership sometimes remains weak, according to current and former department officials. That was a factor, they said, in the 2006 case of a drug-addled man with a loaded pistol who raced through two poorly guarded entrances and into the Capitol. He was detained without harm.
The Capitol Police are unlike other law enforcement agencies in another way: They answer to 535 bosses, the members of Congress.
"No other department has a 535-member city council that oversees it, and no department has literally dozens of [congressional] staffers trying to constantly micromanage that department," said William H. Pickle, the former Senate sergeant-at-arms.
The result is a department sometimes whipsawed by contradictory demands. In April, for example, legislators at a House hearing accused Capitol Police leaders of invading employees' privacy by doing a department-wide criminal check this year.
Now the department is in trouble for not paying more attention to recruits' criminal backgrounds.
And, although lawmakers insist on top-notch security, they don't always appreciate it when measures apply to them. In 2006, then-Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-Ga.) allegedly struck a Capitol Police officer after he refused to allow her to go around a House office building metal detector.
Capitol Police officers have suggested that pressure from lawmakers or staff members might have contributed to the failure of bomb experts to initially spot an improvised explosive in a trash-filled truck parked near the Capitol by a gunman in January.
Sgt. Michael DeCarlo, the senior Capitol Police bomb technician on the scene, testified in court proceedings that his team was "rushed" by supervisors during the truck inspection, which shut down roads just before the start of the Martin Luther King Jr. holiday weekend.
Morse denied that any congressional pressure curtailed the search. He said police supervisors had failed to completely follow policies for bomb inspections. DeCarlo and two other supervisors were reassigned after the incident.
"We have policies and we have procedures, and we have front-line supervisors who were out there to ensure that those things happened in the order in which they should," Morse said.
The recent spate of well-publicized problems has heightened anxieties in the Capitol Police chapter of the Fraternal Order of Police, which is considering holding a no-confidence vote on Morse.
Union members say top leaders have not acknowledged their own errors but are getting tough on officers who make mistakes. They also complain about a lack of communication.
And, although Gainer was a vocal supporter of his officers, Morse has a more reticent and businesslike style that has dismayed some officers.
"Contrary to popular belief, we still care what people think about the department," said union member Michael J. Detorie.
Morse said he had "a great deal of respect" for the union and hoped to meet soon with its leaders. He added that he was frustrated that recent news coverage had missed the "heroic acts" of officers, including those who stopped the gunman in January.
"We do have accountability. There's no police department that doesn't," Morse said, adding that he made his decisions looking at "all the facts, both sides of the story."
Still, he said, "I don't make popular decisions. I make decisions that are best for the organization."
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