| Page 2 of 4 < > |
A Ragtag Pursuit of the Taliban
TOOLBOX
   Resize
COMMENT
 Discussion Policy
 CLOSE
Comments that include profanity or personal attacks or other inappropriate comments or material will be removed from the site. Additionally, entries that are unsigned or contain "signatures" by someone other than the actual author will be removed. Finally, we will take steps to block users who violate any of our posting standards, terms of use or privacy policies or any other policies governing this site. Please review the full rules governing commentaries and discussions. You are fully responsible for the content that you post.
Who's Blogging  |
"Whether you work out here as police commander or not, we have to get this force back up to speed because the insurgency is getting stronger in your district, sir, and your police force is getting smaller," Heintz said. "We have to fix this now. This is an emergency."
The New Commander
Chahar Darreh is located in Kunduz province in a vast stretch of remote steppe and rural valleys in northeastern Afghanistan. While the Taliban is most active in the country's south and east, the threat posed by insurgents is growing here.
A week before Hamid arrived, a suicide bomber on a motorcycle made an unsuccessful run at a German convoy. Later, insurgents opened fire with guns and rocket-propelled grenades on two police substations. Then, in the village of Isa Khel, residents began receiving threatening letters from the Taliban, warning them not to send their daughters to the local girls' school. A few days later, the school was temporarily closed.
For decades, Afghan civilians have had no faith in turning to the police for security. Nepotism, bribery, kickbacks and conspiracy have long been the trademarks of policing in Afghanistan. Other than a brief experiment in the 1960s, there has been little concerted effort to weed out corruption. During the Taliban era, policing mainly consisted of enforcing strictly interpreted Islamic laws.
Hamid, an 18-year police veteran, is the third commander to be assigned to Chahar Darreh in nearly five months. When he arrived in the district from the western province of Herat, he brought an entourage: a brother who served as his driver and another relative who acted as Hamid's personal bodyguard.
Heintz, who helped convict New York mob boss John Gotti Jr. for racketeering, had little patience with Hamid's methods. This is not the best way for the new commander to win the hearts and minds of the locals or inspire the confidence of his men, Heintz told Hamid. A few days after his first meeting with the new commander, Heintz advised Hamid to drop his brother as his driver. Ditto the personal bodyguard. And no more burning up scarce government fuel resources on nightly trips home in the government-owned patrol truck, Heintz told Hamid.
Heinz, a blunt-spoken New Yorker who during his tour in Iraq also helped prosecute Saddam Hussein, said he wanted Hamid to get down to the real business of policing his district.
"My question to you, sir, is what is your plan to defend this district?" Heintz asked.
Hamid seemed bewildered. He looked to one of the Afghan officers sitting next to him. Silence.
"My plan is to enforce the law," said Hamid, 42. "I'm not very familiar with the villages or which villages are vulnerable, and I don't have a plan. But I think we should ambush the Taliban."
Walking the Beat
Hamid did not have a premier fighting force under his command. His officers wore an assortment of hand-me-down combat boots and black vinyl shoes. The old Soviet-era machine weaponry they hauled around was caked with dirt. The men chafed under the weight of the heavy body armor the U.S. soldiers ordered them to wear.
Most were, at best, semiliterate. Many were poor marksmen. Only some knew how to communicate on the standard police radios donated by Western nations. Several wondered whether they should join the dozens of other police officers who had recently walked off the job after learning they would go unpaid for a second month straight.
