Sunday, September 21, 2008
Some very senior Bush administration officials are rushing to claim credit for backing the "surge" of U.S. troops to Iraq, calling it the turning point in the war. But before they spike the ball into the end zone, they might want to listen to John McCreary, a retired analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency, who now puts out a daily e-mail report called "NightWatch." He brings the savvy of a career intelligence official to bear on the day's events -- a function similar to the one he used to perform for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Here, in part of his Sept. 11, 2008, bulletin, McCreary explains why he expects violence to increase in Iraq:
Iraq: Comment on power sharing. Today [the] press covered extensively US General Petraeus' comments about the fragility of security gains achieved during the period of the "surge" in Iraq. The theory of instability suggests Petraeus is well advised to warn.
[Over the past year,] . . . the US, as the most powerful faction, imposed power sharing on the Kurds, the Arab Sunnis and the Arab Shiites . . . . Power sharing is deceptive because it always features reduced violence. It looks like victory, but is not. It always requires participants to compromise their end state goals in order to survive and to continue to struggle.
Power sharing can last a long time, but it is not a permanent condition and does not signify one faction's triumph over the others. It is never an end state, but rather a transitional period during which the participants prepare for the next phase of struggle.
The power sharers always seek to break out of the power sharing arrangement by exploiting the period of relative calm to build capabilities that will enable them to achieve a successful "breakout." One or other group always attempts to break out of the power sharing arrangement to seize control of the government, in the case of Iraq.
Thus, power sharing is always a prelude to violence. It does not last longer than the circumstances that nurtured it. Thus, if US military power and bribes induced power sharing, the period of quiet will not last past the withdrawal of US military power and the end of the payments.
The power sharers also will not tolerate indefinitely the presence of the outside forces that created the power sharing arrangement. They will unite against the outside power to force it out and to enable them to settle the issue of who should govern without outside meddling. In Iraq, this is a serious issue because its end state will invest one or other faction with control of enormous oil wealth.
The Shiites are the most numerous and most likely faction to attempt a breakout of the US-induced power sharing arrangement. Violence is unavoidable when a faction attempts a breakout. In the Directorate of Intelligence [the analytical branch of the CIA], we found no exceptions.
The breakout phenomenon . . . is still some months in the future in Iraq, but nothing can prevent it when it starts. NightWatch expects the Shiites to demand what is rightfully theirs under the principles of democracy that the US imported and which are rather alien to Iraq.
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Tom Ricks is The Post's military correspondent. This feature aims to give readers a snapshot of the conversations about Iraq, Afghanistan and other matters that play out in Ricks's e-mail inbox. Have an interesting document? Send it to TheInbox@washpost.com
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