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For U.S. and Sunni Allies, a Turning Point
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Mohamed Abdul Hussein al-Kurtani, a Sons of Iraq leader in Dora, had been running a local cell of the 1920 Revolution Brigades, an insurgent group that opposed the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq and had been dueling with the local cell of al-Qaeda in Iraq.
"He decided it was a fruitless battle to work against us," said Sgt. Brian Bailey, 31, of Holbrook, Mass. "Instead of hiding in the shadows, they came out."
Kurtani, like most leaders, wears civilian clothes. The guards under his command wear tan uniforms and carry battered AK-47 assault rifles. Most Sons of Iraq are assigned to the neighborhoods where they live and earn $300 to $500 a month.
"At first, the SOI were just guys on street corners," said Lt. Col. Bryan Mullins, 39, of Bristol, Va., a brigade operations officer. "We started integrating them into the security program. They knew the bad guys and they knew who was in the community."
As violence declined this year and Iraqis began demanding more control over security matters, U.S. officials began exploring ways of shrinking the Sons of Iraq.
This summer military officials approached the U.S. Agency for International Development, which oversees humanitarian aid programs overseas, and asked if it would be willing to assume responsibility for the program. The discussions didn't go far, according to a U.S. official familiar with them.
"That funding stream comes with restrictions," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe confidential discussions. "SOI is a pseudo-militia."
Getting Iraqi army and police units to work with Sons of Iraq groups was initially impossible and remains difficult, U.S. military officials say. The Iraqi government has pledged to hire at least 20 percent of the guards as soldiers or policemen and has agreed to keep the rest on the payroll until they find other jobs.
Capt. Zaid Ayad Obaidi al-Rubaie, one of the key National Police leaders in Dora, spoke glowingly to a reporter about the Sons of Iraq in his area during a recent visit, as U.S. soldiers listened in.
"They are Iraqi," the captain said, smoking a cigarette in his small office decorated with fake flowers. "We understand each other. From the beginning, the collaboration was very fruitful, and it continues."
But Sons of Iraq leaders say their relationships with police commanders have been forged under heavy U.S. pressure and remain beset by mutual distrust.
"I feel sorry to say this," said Zaied Subhi, a Sons of Iraq leader. "There is no trust between us."
