No Silver Bullets Here
To hear it from critics on the left and right, the Bush administration and legislative leaders were in such a rush to pass a "$700 billion bailout for Wall Street" that they failed to consider much simpler, cheaper, common sense approaches.
In fact, all of their ideas were considered as part of a contingency planning process over the past year at the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, and given voice during the bipartisan congressional negotiations. Some of the ideas were incorporated in various forms in the bill voted down by the House on Monday, while none is likely to be the silver bullet that proponents suggest.
· Raise the limit on deposit insurance. The government had to rescue three large banks in recent weeks after large depositors -- businesses and investment funds -- began withdrawing money, raising fears of runs on other banks. One idea, now supported by the two presidential candidates as well as by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., is to raise the limit on deposits covered by the government's insurance program from $100,000 per individual account to $250,000.
Here's the problem: Increasing the insurance limit will encourage the weakest banks to lure "hot money" with high interest rates. They would then use the deposits to take big lending risks in the hope of earning big profits and returning to financial health -- "gambling for redemption," as it is known among bankers. That happened in the later stages of the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s, and could happen again if regulators don't take steps to prevent it.
· Suspend mark-to-market accounting. This idea has a big following among conservatives, who always see overzealous regulation as the cause of almost any market failure.
"Fair value" accounting rules require banks to value certain loans and securities on their books -- those that they don't intend to hold forever -- at the price that they are currently trading at on secondary loan markets. That's generally a sound idea when those markets are working well. But now that those markets have virtually collapsed because there aren't enough buyers, prices have plummeted well below what their economic value would be if held until maturity. Requiring banks to use artificially depressed values is making a bad situation even worse.
Given the market situation, banks want to be able to ignore market prices and use their own models to guess at the economic value of the securities. That might make the banks' financial statements look stronger, but might not do much to restore investor confidence. Financial institutions have dragged their feet in acknowledging the extent of their losses in real estate and other lending, and many investors and regulators now believe they can't be trusted to come up with credible alternatives to market prices, as imperfect as they may be. Moreover, without credible financial statements, it would only get harder for the banking system to attract new capital.
The bill defeated by the House did not ignore the accounting issue. It ordered the Securities and Exchange Commission to move quickly to study the issue and granted the agency the power to immediately suspend the mark-to-market rule.