Building on Common Ground With Russia

A soldier atop an armored vehicle yesterday at a Russian checkpoint in Georgia. (By Sergey Ponomarev -- Associated Press)

The Kosovo decision occurred nearly simultaneously with publication of the plan to move anti-ballistic missiles into Poland and the Czech Republic as well as a proposal to invite Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO. Moving the East-West security line, in a historically short period, 1,000 miles to the east while changing the mission of NATO and deploying advanced weapons technology on the territory of former Soviet satellites was not likely to be met with Russian acquiescence.

This narrative explains some of Russia's motivations; it does not seek to justify every response or the confrontational rhetoric occasionally employed. But it suggests the importance of viewing the current conflict with some historical and psychological perspective.

Immediate crises should not deflect us from long-term responsibilities. The six points put forward by French President Nicolas Sarkozy provide a framework for a solution of the Georgian crisis formally accepted by all the parties: a genuinely independent Georgia, within its existing borders, while the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia -- disputed since the founding of Georgia -- continues as the subject of negotiation within the security framework in Sarkozy's points.

In April, President Bush and then-President Putin met in Sochi and outlined a program of joint cooperation to deal with the long-term requirements of world order. It included such subjects as nonproliferation, Iran, energy, climate change, methods to defuse the impact of the anti-ballistic missile deployment in Eastern Europe, and a possible linking of some American and Russian anti-ballistic missile defense systems. The two countries possess more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons; cooperation is imperative if proliferation is to be stopped.

The Sochi document provides a useful road map. Russia, of course, should not be allowed to use the invocation of the common interest as a way to achieve its special concerns by military pressure and intimidation. Those of us who question the urgency with which NATO membership was pursued for Georgia and Ukraine are not advocating a sphere of influence for Russia in Eastern Europe. We consider Ukraine an essential part of the European architecture, and we favor a rapid evolution toward E.U. membership. We do believe that the security of Ukraine and Georgia should be placed in a larger context than mechanically advancing an integrated NATO command to a few hundred miles from Moscow. NATO has already agreed to the principle of membership for Ukraine and Georgia. Delaying its implementation until a new U.S. administration is able to consider its options is not a concession but responsible management of the future.

Finally, our ability to conduct effective foreign policy toward Russia requires energetic efforts to restore our domestic strength. Our financial house must be put in order, regarding not just the immediate crisis but also the structure of entitlement programs. We are far too dependent on oil imports. We need legislation that gives a long-term horizon to comprehensive and determined efforts to end this state of affairs.

Diplomacy without strength is sterile. Strength without diplomacy tempts posturing. We believe that the fundamental interests of the United States, Europe and Russia are more aligned today -- or can be made so -- even in the wake of the Georgian crisis, than at any point in recent history. We must not waste that opportunity.

Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. George P. Shultz was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989.