U.S. Urgently Reviews Policy On Afghanistan

Officials described the Pakistan-based extremist network, which the Pentagon calls "the syndicate," as a loose alliance of three elements. Kashmiri militants, constrained by recent agreements between Pakistan and India, have "leaned over" to assist a domestic terrorist campaign launched by homegrown extremists often referred to as the "Pakistani Taliban," one official said. The Afghan Taliban -- itself divided into several groups -- is based in Pakistan but focused on Afghanistan, as are the forces led by warlords Jalauddin Haqqani and his son Siraj, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, among others. Traditional tribal groups in Pakistan's western, Federally Administered Tribal Areas -- FATA -- are a third element. Those groups are said to be focused primarily on keeping the Pakistani military and government out of their areas, and assisting the Afghan-oriented parts of the network.

Al-Qaeda, composed largely of Arabs and, increasingly, Uzbeks, Chechens and other Central Asians, is described as sitting atop the structure, providing money and training to the others in exchange for sanctuary. "They are oriented to just keeping the Pakistani military and government out of their areas," the intelligence official said. "They help the groups who are interested in Afghanistan."

"There is competition between and among them," a U.S. counterterrorism official said. But their interests increasingly overlap and "they understand the need to support one another."

Intelligence officials said that cooperation among the militant groups was bolstered by the hands-off attitude Pakistan's new civilian coalition government initially adopted toward the FATA last spring. When urgent U.S. appeals to the military and government failed and the coalition moved to oust President Pervez Musharraf, Washington's main Pakistani ally, those who had long advocated stronger U.S. action inside Pakistan finally prevailed with Bush.

Authorization for commando raids coincided with stepped-up attacks by unmanned Predator aircraft flown across the border from Afghanistan. The administration concluded that the ground raids were legal under the self-defense provisions of the U.N. charter, an interpretation that a U.N. official said was questionable.

"The tempo is pretty steady and they want to keep it up," said an individual with close contacts among the U.S. Special Forces units participating in cross-border operations.

The intelligence assessment is also highly pessimistic about the prospects that Afghan President Hamid Karzai can or will move forcefully to stem corruption inside his government or that the flourishing drug trade can be significantly reversed.

Despite the commitment to increase U.S. troop levels, Gates has publicly warned that a larger foreign military "footprint" in Afghanistan may prove counterproductive. Afghanistan hopes to double the size of its army -- to 134,000 -- in the next two years. But maintaining such a force, Gates told Congress, would cost $2 billion to $2.5 billion a year -- at least three times Afghanistan's total revenue for 2008.

In recent months, the Pentagon has sent emissaries around the world with a proposition: If they do not want to fight in Afghanistan, they should at least be prepared to pay for those who do. "There is a real effort made to figure out which among the nations not contributing forces can pony up," a defense official said.

Just before the recent change in government in Japan, he said by way of example, "our Asia guys went over there and said: 'You don't want to send forces? We understand. How about contributing $20 billion over the next five years?' "

The Japanese, he said, "swallowed their chopsticks."

Staff writer Walter Pincus contributed to this report.