Danger Ahead for the Most Dangerous Place in the World

Even during the short periods of civilian rule in Islamabad, the power of the military and the ISI has continued to grow. In the mid-1990s, for instance, the military was racing headlong to acquire nuclear weapons even as Bhutto was assuring U.S. diplomats of Pakistani nuclear restraint. And today, the ultimate authority over the country's nuclear weapons complex rests with the military, which has yet to account for the freewheeling nuclear marketing program -- reaching into Libya, North Korea and who knows where else -- of A.Q. Khan, who, although under nominal house arrest, is still regarded by many Pakistanis as a national hero.

Pakistan's tragedy is that, from the beginning, no government, civilian or military, has fixed the underlying fragility of the state's basic institutions. Instead, democrats and dictators alike have subverted political parties, threatened journalists and cowed the civil service in their quest for short-term political gain and personal advantage. Musharraf, who finally resigned last August under threat of impeachment, had a particularly pernicious tenure; during his nearly nine years in office, the military's long tentacles reached deeper and deeper into Pakistani life. Under fitful pressure from the United States after 9/11, he briefly clamped down on a range of Islamist organizations and Kashmiri radical groups, but within weeks allowed them to reconstitute themselves under different names.

So can Pakistan be reformed, or is it doomed to collapse? Despite the country's post-Musharraf return to civilian rule, its prospects are grim. As of last month, the ISI has a new leader, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, handpicked by the army chief of staff, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, to replace a predecessor whom Bush administration officials suspected of having ties to the Taliban. But there is little reason to believe that Zardari's weak, fractious government will be able to reform the ISI. In July, according to the Economist, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani "tried to bring the ISI under the control of the interior ministry. His decision was reversed within hours."

The country could once again make a desultory return to military rule as its troubles mount. The generals may well be able to restore some semblance of stability, but their ties to the Islamists and the ISI's ongoing soft spot for the Taliban will only lead Pakistan further into the vortex. Meanwhile, Pakistani troops have fired on U.S. forces launching raids across the Afghan border; Obama has promised to strike inside Pakistan if Islamabad refuses to act upon good intelligence about the whereabouts of al-Qaeda leaders; and McCain has vowed to pursue bin Laden "to the gates of hell." It's not a soothing picture.

We need a stern, serious international effort -- led by the United States -- to put Pakistan back together again, reform its institutions and reorder its priorities. If not, we will face a terrifying prospect: Pakistan's collapse (slow or otherwise) into a full-blown failed state, armed with nuclear weapons, riven by ethnic tensions, suffused with resentment and zealotry, and with roving bands of Taliban sympathizers and bin Ladenists in its midst.

Sumit Ganguly is director of research at the Center on American and Global Security at Indiana University and an adjunct fellow at the Pacific Council on International Policy.