Tom Ricks's Inbox

Working with other nations' militaries is never easy. In an interview posted on an Army Web site, former British Army Brig. Ed Butler, who commanded British forces in southern Afghanistan in 2006, told a U.S. Army historian about his frustrations with U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Benjamin Freakley, who was the U.S. commander in Afghanistan at the time:

I do not believe that General Freakley ever fully understood one of the key principles of coalition operations: engage very early with your coalition partners. It is a well-known lesson, but it did not occur in this case. . . . You need to sit down and agree what your national issues are, what your red cards might be, what your force capabilities and capacities are, what your government may or may not be prepared for you to do. . . . Different nations have different risk thresholds. They have different casualty concerns. They have different election timelines, et cetera, back in their capitals.

Political and policy issues and pressures will always drive tactical decision making on the ground. And I think what General Freakley did not appreciate in the early stages was that there was a huge amount of pressure within the U.K. government at the time. . . . The Iraq war was not going well from a U.K. perspective. One of the government scientists . . . had committed suicide. [British Prime Minister Tony] Blair was under considerable public, political, government and his own Labor Party pressure, which dictated the risk appetites that the U.K. was prepared to take in this new theater. . . . I think this was never understood by General Freakley when he and I had our various meetings. He could not understand why I had to check what London's view was on any particular task.

. . . I think that was a frustration behind one of General Freakley's outbursts. "Hey, you're working for me, Ed. Your forces are assigned to me; then you should follow orders and get on with it." I replied, "Yes, we do that, but you have to understand what the political context is of the position you are asking me to take." And that is the same for any coalition operation, whether the Danes have an election coming or the Estonians have a hung parliament, whatever it might be will influence the levers and pulleys which you can employ when utilizing military force. . . . It was interpreted by the recipients in the room [at another meeting] that General Freakley was suggesting that the Brits were not fighting and had a risk-averse approach to combat operations. Well, that was as red a flag to a paratrooper as you can imagine. . . . So that was not a helpful meeting.

* * *

Tom Ricks is The Post's military correspondent. This feature aims to give readers a snapshot of the conversations about Iraq, Afghanistan and other matters that play out in Ricks's e-mail inbox. Have an interesting document? Send it to TheInbox@washpost.com.