Problems Plague U.S. Flex-Fuel Fleet

Tonya Jackson, a Postal Service worker, fills up her flex-fuel vehicle at the Brentwood facility in Washington. (By Dayna Smith For The Washington Post)

To persuade automakers to ramp up production, Congress in 1988 struck a deal. For each flex-fuel vehicle produced, automakers would win lucrative credits to help them achieve fuel-efficiency mandates.

Under the system, a flex-fuel vehicle might achieve 16 miles per gallon, for example, but with the credits an average of 24 mpg could be claimed. The formula assumed the vehicles would run on alternative fuel half the time.

Manufacturers liked flex-fuel models, because they cost only about $50 more per vehicle to produce. To prevent corrosion from the alcohol-based fuel, they used a specially lined tank and stainless-steel fuel lines instead of aluminum.

Manufacturers started producing them in their best-selling models: large sedans and SUVs. For agencies, purchasing the large fuel-guzzling vehicles proved problematic.

"They were bigger, they ran on gas, and they weren't fuel-efficient,'' said Mark Gaffigan, director of natural resources and environment with the Government Accountability Office, which completed a program audit last month. "If they had just bought regular vehicles that were more fuel-efficient, they would be better off."

(Last year, Congress moved to phase out the flex-fuel credits by 2020, because several studies verified that the larger vehicles had led to increased gasoline consumption and greenhouse gas emissions.)

Four years after granting the flex-fuel credits, Congress passed EPAct, giving automakers a guaranteed market. In 1992, Sen. J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.) said EPAct would "solve the chicken-and-the-egg proposition with respect to alternative fuels," and President George H.W. Bush said it would "steadily increase U.S. energy security."

Seven years later, a lawsuit filed by the Center for Biological Diversity, the Bluewater Network and the Sierra Club tried to force more progress by making agencies comply with the law.

"We did not know there was no intent to run them on the alternative fuels or that the vehicles sometimes got lower gas mileage,'' said Jay Tutchton, a lawyer who worked for Earthjustice, a law firm that represented the groups. "They could have done better, in many cases, if they'd stuck with smaller vehicles that ran on regular gasoline."

Waivers Abound

Another shortcoming of EPAct was that it did not require fleet managers to track vehicle locations. The fleet grew, but no one knew how it was taking shape.

This discouraged private investment in fueling stations because industry needed better data.

"I have to be able to justify it economically. I need a business plan that shows it's worth the investment for my costs of getting the fuel there and putting in a station. The best data every time is where the federal fleet is located," said Curtis Donaldson, president of Texas-based CleanFuel USA, which builds propane and E85 stations.