A War's Impossible Mission

Upon receiving the intelligence report, Hill's men immediately put the accused Afghans in plastic flex-cuffs and took them to the base's coffee shop. The total number of detainees is disputed; some witnesses testified that there were as many as 25, while most others put the number closer to 12 or 13.

In a statement through his lawyer, Neal Puckett, Hill said that on a number of occasions, the intelligence that the alleged informants provided to the Taliban could have had deadly consequences for his men. In one case, he said, he confirmed that information had been leaked to enemy forces, warning them of a major U.S. operation against them hours before the mission was due to begin. Hill added that several improvised explosive devices had been planted on the planned route, although they were neutralized without injury to his soldiers. "It is without a doubt that the detainees we took, all twelve of them, were involved in providing early warning to the enemy that injured and or killed thirty of my men during our six months in Wardak," Hill said in the statement.

U.S. forces detain Afghans for any number of reasons. But according to International Security and Assistance Force rules, by which all U.S. forces in Afghanistan must abide, these detentions can last no longer than 96 hours. The detainees must then be either released, handed over to Afghan security forces or formally arrested and placed in the custody of the unit's commanding battalion. Once in battalion custody, detainees may can be questioned by trained military or intelligence interrogators.

Requests to send detainees to battalion are a routine matter. Over the past year, Hill's company made at least 10 such requests, although none were approved, according to 1st Lt. Larry Kay, Hill's executive officer. Kay, who is also facing charges related to the incident, added that other U.S. companies' detainees are routinely accepted by battalion and blames the repeated denials on friction between Hill and his battalion command.

As the 96-hour window began to close last August, Kay made frantic calls to battalion headquarters, trying to secure the arrest of the detainees his men were holding. The detainees "knew who everyone [on FOB Airborne] was," Kay said. "They knew where everyone slept, they knew where our artillery was placed, which then became the target of rocket attacks. . . . I didn't want to let these guys go." Kay said that his calls went unheeded.

Battalion commander Lt. Col. Tony DeMartino declined to discuss the specifics of the incident. He did say that generally, "We like to see the Afghans do the formal detainee process so that [the detainees] are in the Afghan chain of command."

Worried about the safety of their men, Hill and Scott resorted to drastic measures. Though it is unclear exactly who initially planned to detain the Afghans, Hill acknowledges that the ultimate responsibility is his. "I did wrongfully discharge my weapon and I did fail to maintain control of the situation," he said in his statement at the hearing.

According to testimony from a number of witnesses, it was Scott, the first sergeant, who began interrogating the bound detainees. He straddled their chests one at a time as they lay on the ground, pinning their shoulders with his knees and slapping their faces while shouting questions.

"My whole twenty-plus-year career in the military has been about taking care of soldiers," Scott said after the hearing concluded. "I couldn't let these men go just so that they could come back and kill some of my boys. It made no sense."

At some point during the interrogation, a few of the detainees were blindfolded and taken to an area just outside the coffee shop. Then, according to many who testified at the hearing, Hill removed his 9mm pistol from a leather shoulder-holster and fired at least once into the ground, about 20 yards from the nearest detainee. Inside the coffee shop, after the shot rang out, Scott asked the other detainees, "Do you want to die like your friend?"

Through his attorney, Scott denied that he had said any such thing.

Witnesses testified that the detainees were eventually released into the custody of Afghan intelligence officials. DeMartino, the battalion commander, said that when Afghans are detained by coalition forces, they are generally kept in the custody of NATO forces or released. "Sometimes," he said, "we'll just release them, and we'll ask [the Afghan police or intelligence agency] to give them a ride home."