U.S.-Funded Intelligence Center Struggles in Khyber Region

Although the center opened in March, it wasn't fully staffed and operational until late July. Logistical problems, political wrangling and the Pakistani military's reluctance were the main reasons for the delay, according to people familiar with the center's operations. Officials at the center say the Pakistani military frequently ignores or denies requests for specific information about insurgent activities in Pakistan's tribal areas.

"There's a hell of a lot of lip service. The Pakistanis talk a good game but don't play a good game," said a U.S. officer who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of military and diplomatic sensitivities.

Meanwhile, the area experienced a sharp increase in insurgent attacks. From January 2007 to November 2007 there were at least 431 insurgent attacks along the border. In the same period last year, there were 625 attacks, an increase of 45 percent, according to U.S. military data.

U.S. intelligence experts say the attacks started increasing in 2006, after the Pakistani military struck peace deals with Taliban fighters in Pakistan's lawless tribal areas. The brief respite gave insurgent leaders a chance to devise a strategy aimed at chipping away at NATO's lifeline through the Khyber Pass. Last year, officers at the center watched as that strategy unfolded only a few miles from where they sat.

The center, occupying two hangar-style barracks, is located next to a small U.S. military fort at the foot of a barren mountain ridge. The two-lane highway that serves as the main transit route for NATO supplies is clearly visible from the well-fortified guard towers. Afghan, Pakistani and U.S. officers share not only intelligence there, but also meals and very close quarters.

Much of the officers' working day is spent in an airy control room equipped with five large television and computer screens. While the officers quietly tap away at their keyboards, one of the big screens shows constant feeds from the al-Jazeera news channel. At the back of the room, several U.S. officers man a bank of flat-screen computer monitors and phones marked "Secret."

Another large screen shows real-time video footage taken by the U.S. Predator drones that move in ghostly waves along the border. There are plans to expand the center to make better use of such intelligence, Lowe said. For now, the center has no officers who are expert in analyzing the data sent back by the Predators.

"None of us has the background to be able to interpret what's on the screen," said Villareal, the military contractor. "So it's useful and looks impressive, but it's just like watching TV."

Afghan and Pakistani officers at the center were barred from talking to a reporter during a recent visit. But a glance around the room showed several of them primarily engaged in watching a wrestling match on one of the big TV screens and playing computer solitaire. Their U.S. counterparts, meanwhile, sorted through e-mails from the CIA and other agencies about insurgent activities.

None of the U.S. officers at the Khyber Center speaks Dari, Pashto or Urdu, the local languages. Every decision and bit of information must be conveyed through an interpreter and often through the separate Afghan and Pakistani military command structures. Afghan and Pakistani interpreters sometimes hold back details, Villareal said.

But, Lowe said, the addition of more U.S. staff and technology could help by reducing insurgent attacks and as a result defusing tensions between the Afghans and Pakistanis.

"In this environment, as long as they're talking, then they're not shooting at each other, and that's success," he said.