Experts Warn of Troops' Loss of Logistical Support

The U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq will create a shortage of helicopters and logistics support that high-level officials worry will hamper the elite U.S. troops who stay behind to train Iraqi forces and to combat terrorist networks, according to experts studying the problem.

The shortage is part of an overall logistics crunch that the Pentagon is grappling with as it shifts forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, where the rugged terrain and lack of infrastructure require more helicopter transport, engineers and a slew of other support capabilities.

As the U.S. military pulls out the bulk of its 142,000 troops from Iraq by August 2010, troops such as Army Green Berets, who are specially trained to partner with foreign forces, are expected to remain in significant numbers.

Yet those troops currently are dependent upon the basing, aviation, communications and other logistical backing of conventional U.S. Army brigades that are slated to leave the country.

Senior Special Operations officials "are really worried about the conventional Army pulling out of Iraq and leaving us holding the bag unable to support ourselves," said Roger Carstens, who studied the problem as a nonresident fellow for the Center for a New American Security and testified on the issue last week before a House panel.

The leadership of the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla., is particularly concerned about the Army's difficulty in splitting off from its brigades vital capabilities including intelligence, communications and helicopters that are needed by the Special Operations troops, Carstens said.

"A lot of people do not understand that SOF [Special Operations forces] are really unable to support themselves," said Carstens, who is currently working at Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Va.

In the longer term, the Pentagon should consider creating at least two additional helicopter battalions dedicated to Special Operations forces, according to Robert Martinage, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, who also testified last week before the terrorism subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, about two-thirds of Special Operations ground units do not have their own aviation and rely on regular Army units to provide it, Martinage said. As a result, he said that "in Afghanistan, nearly 50 percent of the lift requests" to support the Special Operations task force there "are routinely unmet," he said.

The shortage of aviation comes as Green Berets and other Special Operations forces are experiencing their heaviest deployments in history as they carry out critical roles of partnering with local security forces and conducting high-level raids in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Pentagon in 2006 launched an effort to increase by 13,000 the overall number of Special Operations forces, which include Army Green Berets and Rangers and Navy SEALs. However, that growth did not include a proportional increase in helicopters and fixed-wing planes to transport the forces, Martinage said.

"This shortfall really is something that needs to be addressed as soon as possible," he said.

Recruiting for the elite units has proven challenging because of the high percentage of candidates who must drop out of the rigorous qualification process. Another challenge, Carstens said, is that Special Operations Command is facing bureaucratic hurdles to recruiting more legal immigrants who have cultural, language and ethnic backgrounds that would allow Special Operations forces to more easily operate overseas.