Opening Bids

President Obama and Israel's new prime minister take each other's measure.

IT WAS not hard to discern the incipient cracks in U.S.-Israeli relations behind the show of friendliness between President Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu at the White House on Monday. Mr. Obama spoke about the need for "serious movement" toward a "two-state solution" ; Mr. Netanyahu pointedly avoided any mention of statehood for Palestinians. The Israeli leader harped on the urgency of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and the need to leave "all options on the table"; Mr. Obama said that until the end of this year, options other than negotiations would not be on the table. Mr. Obama stressed that Israeli settlements in the West Bank "have to be stopped in order for us to move forward"; Mr. Netanyahu, who is committed to the "natural growth" of settlements, said any action would have to be linked to reciprocal steps by the Palestinians.

The cracks need not widen into a split. But if their public statements were any indication, Mr. Obama and Mr. Netanyahu gave little ground in the hour and 45 minutes they spent together one-on-one. Afterward, Mr. Obama was particularly striking in saying that "the United States is going to roll up our sleeves" and be "a strong partner" in seeking the Palestinian state that Mr. Netanyahu resists. If that's true, the president's frankness was a necessary first step. Neither Mr. Netanyahu's government nor Palestinian and Arab leaders are likely to make the concessions needed for peace without concerted and visible pushing from the White House.

The administration's strategy seems to center on broadening Israeli-Palestinian talks to include Arab states and outside powers such as the European Union and Russia. All would have in common the interest of thwarting Iran's outsized regional ambitions. Mr. Obama's envoy, former senator George J. Mitchell, has been seeking to broker initial confidence-building measures that might include Arab grants of overflight rights or trade privileges to Israel in exchange for a settlement freeze. Mr. Netanyahu is intrigued by the potential of a de facto Israel-Arab alliance on Iran; he and Mr. Obama agreed to set up working groups to consider what can be done. But the Israeli leader will be inclined to indefinitely delay any significant Israeli moves; were he to commit himself to a Palestinian state or a settlement freeze, his governing coalition might well collapse.

It may be that a mere show of U.S. sleeve-rolling on the peace process, along with pro forma Israeli cooperation, will provide adequate cover for Arab states that are eager to join in an anti-Iranian alliance. That is what Mr. Netanyahu is calculating. If Mr. Obama genuinely intends to press for an early Israeli-Palestinian settlement, he will have to push U.S.-Israeli relations into a red zone of tension for the first time in many years. He would do well to make clear to Israeli voters that any government that will not explicitly embrace Palestinian statehood or an end to settlements will not have smooth relations with Washington. Even if that does not lead to a Middle East peace, it could help lay the groundwork for one in the future.