Sen. Cornyn Questions Judge Sotomayor at Supreme Court Nomination Hearings
Thursday, July 16, 2009; 10:52 AM
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LEAHY: Senator Cornyn, who, as I mentioned yesterday, is a former Supreme Court justice of Texas as well as former attorney general, valued member of this committee.
CORNYN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Judge.
SOTOMAYOR: Good morning, Senator.
CORNYN: Judge, when we met the first time, as I believe I recounted earlier, I made a pledge to you that I would do my best to make sure you were treated respectfully and this would be a fair process. I just want to ask you upfront: Do you feel like you've been given a chance to explain your record and your judicial philosophy to the American people?
SOTOMAYOR: I have, sir. And every senator on both sides of the aisle that have made that promise to me have kept it fully.
CORNYN: And, Judge, you know, the test is not whether Judge Sonia Sotomayor is intelligent. You are. The test is not whether we like you. I think, speaking personally, I think we all do. The test is not even whether we admire you or we respect you, although we do admire you and respect what you've accomplished.
The test is really, what kind of justice will you be if confirmed to the Supreme Court of the United States? Will you be one that adheres to a written Constitution and written laws, that -- and respect the right of the people to make their laws through their elected representatives, or will you pursue a -- some other agenda, personal, political, ideological, that is something other than enforcing the law?
I think those are the -- that is really the question.
And, of course, the purpose of these hearings is -- as you've gone through these tedious rounds of questioning, is to allow us to clear up any confusion about your record and about your judicial philosophy, yet so far I find there's still some confusion.
For example, in 1996, you said the idea of a stable, quote, "capital L Law" was a public myth. This week, you said that fidelity to the law is your only concern.
In 1996, you argued that indefiniteness in the law was a good thing because it allowed judges to change the law. Today you characterized that argument as being only that ambiguity can't exist and that it is Congress's job to change the law.
In 2001, you said that innate physiological differences of judges would or could impact their decisions. Yesterday, you characterized that argument as being only that innate physiological differences of litigants could change decisions. In 2001, you disagreed explicitly with Justice O'Connor's view of whether a wise man and wise woman would reach the same decision. Yet, during these hearings, you characterized your argument as being that you agreed with her.
A few weeks ago, in your speech on foreign law to the American Civil Liberties Union, you rejected the approach of Justices Alito and Thomas with regard to foreign law, and yet it seems to me, during these hearings, you have agreed with them.
So, Judge, what should I tell my constituents who are watching these hearings and saying to themselves, "In Berkeley and other places around the country, she says one thing, but at these hearings, you are saying something which sounds contradictory, if not diametrically opposed, to some of the things you've said in speeches around the country"?
SOTOMAYOR: I would tell them to look at my decisions for 17 years and note that, in every one of them, I have done what I say that I so firmly believe in. I prove my fidelity to the law, the fact that I do not permit personal views, sympathies or prejudices to influence the outcome of cases, rejecting the challenges of numerous plaintiffs with undisputably sympathetic claims, but ruling the way I have on the basis of law rejecting those claims, I would ask them to look at the speeches completely, to read what their context was and to understand the background of those issues that are being discussed.
I didn't disagree with what I understood was the basic premise that Justice O'Connor was making, which was that being a man or a woman doesn't affect the capacity of someone to judge fairly or wisely. What I disagreed was with the literal meaning of her words because neither of us meant the literal meaning of our words. My use of her words was pretty bad in terms of leaving a bad impression. But both of us were talking about the value of experience and the fact that it gives you equal capacity.
In the end, I would tell your constituents, Senators, look at my record and understand that my record talks about who I am as a person, what I believe in and my judgment and my opinion. But following the rule of law is the foundation of our system of justice.
CORNYN: Thank you for that -- for your answer, Judge. You know, I actually agree that your judicial record strikes me as pretty much in the mainstream of -- of judicial decision making by district court judges and by court of appeals judges on the federal bench. And while I think what is creating this cognitive dissidence for many of us and for many of my constituents who I've been hearing from is that you appear to be a different person almost in your speeches and in some of the comments that you've made. So I guess part of what we need to do is to try to reconcile those, as I said earlier.
You said that -- I want to pivot to a slightly different subject and go back to your statement that the courts should not make law. You've also said that the Supreme Court decisions that a lot of us believe made law actually were an interpretation of the law.
So I'm -- I would like for you to clarify that. If the Supreme Court in the next few years holds that there is a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, would that be making the law? Or would that be interpreting the law? I'm not asking you to classify -- excuse me. I'm not asking you to prejudge that case or the merits of the arguments, but just to characterize whether that would be interpreting the law or whether that would be making the law. SOTOMAYOR: Senator, that question is so embedded with its answer, isn't it? Meaning if the court rules one way and I say that's making law, then it forecasts that I have a particular view of whatever arguments may be made on this issue, suggesting that it's interpreting the Constitution. I understand the seriousness of this question. I understand the seriousness of same-sex marriage.
SOTOMAYOR: But I also know, as I think all America knows, that this issue is being hotly debated on every level of our three branches of government. It's being debated in Congress. And Congress has passed an act relating to same-sex marriage. It's being debated in various courts on the state level. Certain higher courts have made rulings.
This is the type of situation where even the characterizing of whatever the court may do as one way or another suggests that I have both prejudged an issue and that I come to that issue with my own personal views suggesting an outcome. And neither is true. I would look at that issue in the context of the case that came before me with a completely open mind.
CORNYN: Forget the same-sex marriage hypothetical. Is there a difference, in your mind, between making the law and interpreting the law? Or is this a distinction without a difference?
SOTOMAYOR: Oh, no. It's a very important distinction. Laws are written by Congress. If has -- it makes factual findings. In determines, in its judgment, what the fit is between the law it's passing and the remedy. It's -- that its giving as a right.
The courts, when they're interpreting, always have to start with what does the Constitution say, what is the words of the Constitution, how has precedent interpreting those, what are the principles that it has discussed govern a particular situation.
CORNYN: How do you reconcile that answer with your statement that courts of appeals make policy?
SOTOMAYOR: In both cases in which I've used that word in two different speeches -- one was a speech, one was a remark to students -- this is almost like the discussion fundamental -- what does it mean to a non-lawyer and fundamental, what it means in the context of Supreme Court legal theory.
CORNYN: Are you saying it's only a discussion that lawyers could lot of?
SOTOMAYOR: Not love. But in the context in both contexts, it's very, very clear that I'm talking about completely the difference between the two judgings and that circuit courts, when they issue a holding, it becomes precedent on all similar cases.
In both comments, those -- that statement was made absolutely expressly that that was the context of the kind of policy I was talking about, which is the ramifications of a precedent on all similar cases. When Congress talks about policy, it's talking about someone totally different. It's talking about making law, what are the choices that I'm going to make in law -- in making the law.
Those are two different things. I wasn't talking about courts making law. In fact, in the Duke speech, I said -- I used making policy in terms of its ramifications on existing cases. But I never said in either speech we make law in the sense that Congress would.
CORNYN: Let me turn to another topic. In 1996, when you -- after you'd been on the federal bench for four years, you wrote a law review article -- the Suffolk University Law Review. And this pertains to campaign financing.
You said, quote, "Our system of election financing permits extensive private, including corporate, financing of candidates' campaigns raising again and again the question of whether -- of what the difference is between contributions and bribes and how legislators or other officials can operate objectively on behalf of the electorate."
CORNYN: You said, "Can elected officials say with credibility that they're carrying out the mandate of a democratic society representing only the generally public good when private money plays such a large role in their campaigns?"
Judge Sotomayor, what is the difference, to your mind, between a political contribution and a bribe?
SOTOMAYOR: The context of that statement was a question about what was perking through the legal system at the time and has been, as you know, before the Supreme Court since Buckley v. Vallejo. In Buckley...
CORNYN: I -- I agree, Your Honor. But what -- my question is, what, in your mind, is the difference between a political contribution and a bribe?
SOTOMAYOR: The question is, is a contributor seeking to influence or to buy someone's vote? And there are situations in which elected officials have been convicted of taking a bribe because they have agreed in exchange for a sum of money to vote on a particular legislation in a particular way. That is -- violates the federal law.
The question that was discussed there was a much broader question as to, where do you draw that line as a society? What choices do you think about in terms of what -- what Congress will do, what politicians will do?
I've often spoken about the difference between what the law permits and what individuals should use to guide their conduct. The fact that the law says you can do this doesn't always mean that you as a person should choose to do this.
And, in fact, we operate within the law. You don't -- you should not be a lawbreaker. But you should act in situations according to that sense of what's right or wrong.
We had the recent case that the Supreme Court considered of the judge who was given an extraordinary amount of money by a campaign contributor, dwarfing everything else in his campaign in terms of contributions, funding a very expensive campaign.
CORNYN: In fact -- in fact -- in fact, that was not a direct contribution to the judge, was it?
SOTOMAYOR: Well, it wasn't a direct contribution, but it was a question there where the Supreme Court said, the appearance of impropriety in this case would have counseled the judge to get off, because...
CORNYN: Let's get back to my question, if I can, and let me ask you this. Last year, President Obama set a record in fundraising from private sources, raising an unprecedented amount of campaign contributions. Do you think, given your law review article, that President Obama can say with credibility that he's carrying out the mandate of a democratic society?
SOTOMAYOR: That wasn't what I was talking about in that speech. I don't -- I don't know...
CORNYN: Well, I realize he wasn't elected in 1996, but what I'm -- what I'm getting at is, are you basically painting with such a broad brush when it comes to people's rights under the First Amendment to participate in the political process, either to volunteer their time, make in-kind contributions, make financial contributions? Do you consider that a form of bribery or in any way improper?
SOTOMAYOR: No, sir.
CORNYN: OK. Thank you.
SOTOMAYOR: No, sir.
CORNYN: Thank you for your answer.
In the short time we have remaining, let me return to -- to the New Haven firefighter case briefly. As you know, two witnesses, I believe, will testify after you're through, and I'm sure you will welcome being finished with this period of questioning.
A lot of attention has been given to the lead plaintiff, Frank Ricci, who is a dyslexic and the hardship he's endured in order to prepare for this competitive examination only to see the competitive examination results thrown out.
CORNYN: But I was struck on July the 3rd in the New York Times, when they featured another firefighter, who will testify here today, and that was Benjamin Vargas. Benjamin Vargas is the son of Puerto Rican parents, as you probably know, and he found himself in the odd position, to say the least, of being discriminated against based on his race, based on the decisions by the circuit court panel that you sat on.
The closing of the article, because Lieutenant Vargas -- who hopes to be Captain Vargas as a result of the Supreme Court decision because he scored sixth on the comprehensive examination -- at the very last paragraph in this article, he -- it says, "Gesturing toward his three sons, Lieutenant Vargas explained why he had no regrets. He said, 'I want to give them a fair shake. To get a job on the merits, not because they're Hispanic or to fill a quota.' He said, 'What a lousy way to live.'" That's his testimony.
So I want to ask you, in conclusion, do you agree with Chief Justice John Roberts when he says, "The best way to stop discriminating based on race is to stop discriminating based on race"?
SOTOMAYOR: The best way to live in our society is to follow the command of the Constitution, provide equal opportunity for all. And I follow what the Constitution says, that is, how the law should be structured and how it should be applied to whatever individual circumstances come before the court.
CORNYN: With respect, Judge, my question was do you agree with Chief Justice John Roberts's statement, or do you disagree?
SOTOMAYOR: The question of agreeing or disagreeing suggests an opinion on what the ruling was in the case he used it in, and I accept the court's ruling in that case. And that was a very recent case.
There is no quarrel that I have, no disagreement. I don't accept that, in that situation, that statement the court found applied. I just said the issue is a constitutional one - equal opportunity for all under the law.
CORNYN: I understand that you might not want to comment on what Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in an opinion, even though I don't think he was speaking of a specific case but rather an approach to the law which would treat us all as individuals with equal dignity and equal rights.
But let me ask you whether you agree with Martin Luther King when he said he dreamed of a day when his children would be judged not by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character. Do you agree with that?
SOTOMAYOR: I think every American agrees with that (inaudible).
Yield back, Mr. Chairman.
LEAHY: Thank you, Senator Cornyn.