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Washington Nationals and Their Version of Moneyball

"We can do those things. We just have to do those things."

Actually, the Nats could afford to do all this and more. The bullpen arms they talk about don't include a costly closer. Add an $8-million-a-year right fielder if you want, too. (They won't.)

The paradox of the Nats was apparent in their final homestand. In nine games, at which you might expect empty stands, the Nats averaged 22,990 fans vs. their average of 22,719. Same old story: Some of us were the incorrigible core; some came to see a popular foe (Dodgers); and 85,174 arrived last weekend just because the weather was nice and, well, it was the last baseball this year.

Baseball awarded the Lerners such a popular core American product, still relatively affordable, and the District built them such a pretty new ballpark, that they can't keep people away. Attendance ranked above six teams, and if the average had been just 1,000 higher (as it might be once Strasburg arrives), the Nats would have been ahead of 10 teams. Factor in the Nats' big-market ticket prices, and they stand right in the middle of baseball in gate receipts.

To see how well the Nats are doing, even though the Lerners' public position is that they will "take no money out of the team" in the first 10 years, compare them to the Pirates: Since the Lerners took over, the Nats have outdrawn the Pirates by 1.4 million fans and, at higher ticket prices, produced about $100 million more in gate revenues. The Nats' local TV revenue (about $24 million a year) is also far higher.

On the other hand, the Lerners paid far more for the Nats, and borrowed more money, a debt that must be serviced.

The Nats provide no information on how they define "taking no money out of the team," except Ted Lerner's comments to me twice that he considers debt service as a cost. Kasten adds that Forbes magazine's '08 ranking of the Nats as the second-most profitable team in baseball is "way off." How so? No detail. Sorry.

Such privacy is their corporate right, but it's hardly forthcoming from a family that presented itself as a long-term partner with the District in the civic-minded attempt to revive Southeast with baseball as an expensive core catalyst.

Kasten assures me I can't possibly grasp the Nats' high finance. He even threw up his hands in exasperation, a new touch.

"That shows how much you don't know," Kasten said.

Here's one theory: After speaking with executives of other teams about their borrowing structures, one approach is to secure highly leveraged term loans with revolving lines of credit and then to amortize principal in the manner of a mortgage; that way, owners can claim to take little or no money out of the teams while still building their equity (and thus their own net worth).

Unlike the tiny-town teams, the Nats are a franchise with a defining choice to make. But it won't be psychologically easy. Teams such as the Padres have argued that, unless you are one of the sport's traditional "haves," it's not a winning business proposition to add tens of millions to payroll to build a better team. Ironically, the way the game is structured, it's safer and easier to be a lousy cheap club, but be ensured a decent buck.

Kasten vows that the Nats still have the same big-market dreams they proclaimed three years ago when the Lerners brought a team back to their home town, claiming they would build a franchise worthy of "the most important city in the world." The Dunn, Zimmerman and Strasburg deals are merely first tastes. Just wait -- but not long. That's their pitch.

No Washington team has lost more than 106 games since 1909 -- 100 years ago. The Nats could still reach 107 this weekend.

If the Lerners keep their promises, that is an opportunity that should never, ever come again.

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