What to Do With Hamas? Question Snarls Peace Bid
Islamist Group's Resilience and Obstinacy Frustrate Many
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Wednesday, October 7, 2009
GAZA CITY -- In the two years since it seized power here, the militant Hamas movement has undercut the influence of the Gaza Strip's major clans, brought competing paramilitary groups under its control, put down an uprising by a rival Islamist group, weathered a three-week war with Israel, worked around a strict economic embargo -- and through it all refused a set of international demands that could begin Gaza's rehabilitation.
That combination of durability and unwillingness to compromise has created a deep-seated stalemate that has left top Israeli intelligence and political officials perplexed about what to do, and it has posed a steep obstacle for U.S. peace envoy George J. Mitchell. Mitchell's work in Northern Ireland in the 1990s included intense negotiations to bring the most militant parties into the process, but his eight months of talks about Israeli-Palestinian peace have avoided any obvious effort to do the same with Hamas and have been conducted, in effect, with only one half of the Palestinian political leadership.
A separate Egyptian effort aims to reconcile Hamas and the pro-U.S., West Bank-based government of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, create a joint security force and pave the way for elections next year that could bring Palestinian society under a single political leadership. But Palestinian, Israeli and international diplomats and analysts give the process only a slim chance of success and see little sign that Hamas is ready to trade its clear control of the Gaza Strip for a seat at the negotiating table.
Barack Obama's election as U.S. president and his June speech in Cairo raised expectations among Hamas officials of a dialogue with the United States, but "people are starting to lose hope. There was a glimmer, but it is fading away," said Hamas deputy foreign minister Ahmed Yousef, adding that Mitchell's work has produced "no solution and no breakthrough."
A top Israeli security official said there has been a frustrated acknowledgment in Israeli intelligence and military circles that, as it stands, there is no obvious alternative to continued Hamas rule in Gaza. The Palestinian Authority is not strong enough to return to power there, Israel does not want to reoccupy an area it vacated in 2005, and there is concern that any collapse of Hamas rule might increase the influence of even more militant groups.
"We don't like them, but they have accountability," said the official, adding that Hamas is struggling to reconcile running a government and staying in power without losing its credentials as a resistance movement. At present, he said, the group is trying to maintain a policy of what the Israeli military refers to as "industrial quiet" -- suppressing most rocket fire into Israel as part of a pause in violence that is practical, for rearming, and strategic, to ensure its hold on power. How, when and whether Hamas might tip back toward fighting is uncertain. When diplomats, outside negotiators and others ask for ideas about how to cope with Hamas in the long term, the Israeli official said, the answer is: "We don't know. Good luck."
Hamas, which was founded as an Islamist alternative to the Palestine Liberation Organization and whose charter calls for Israel's destruction, is considered a terrorist group by the United States for its sponsorship of suicide attacks and the launching of thousands of missiles and mortar shells from Gaza into Israel. The group draws financial and material support from Iran and Syria. Hamas says its attacks on Israel are defensive and a legitimate tactic in Palestinian efforts to establish a homeland.
Mitchell faced a similar dilemma during the Northern Ireland peace process, when there was opposition to the inclusion of the Irish Republican Army in the talks and demands that the group disarm before becoming party to the discussions.
But as Mitchell and fellow peace envoy Richard N. Haass would later write, "It's hard to stop a war if you don't talk with those who are involved in it."
In the case of Northern Ireland, Mitchell argued as a senator for IRA leader Gerry Adams to be granted a U.S. visa. As a peace envoy, Mitchell took a controversial stand in favor of letting the IRA retain its weapons while joining the peace talks -- evidence of his belief that "preconditions ought to be kept to a minimum."
But the group had to endorse what came to be known as the "Mitchell principles" of democracy and nonviolence. Similarly, there has been a standing offer from the United States and other nations to reopen talks with Hamas if the group meets certain conditions, including a renunciation of violence, adherence to prior agreements made on behalf of the Palestinians and a recognition of Israel.
According to officials from Hamas and analysts of the group, those conditions are unlikely to be accepted, cutting as they do to the core of the group's ideology and strategy. Just as there is no sense that the language of Hamas leaders has come close to meeting those requirements, despite talk of a possible compromise, there has been no obvious effort by Mitchell's team to try to reshape the conditions.





