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Afghanistan could turn into Vietnam. Let's hope so.
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Undoubtedly, Afghanistan would offer different postwar challenges than Vietnam. Of course, the campaign there is far from over -- it may even be escalated, if Obama agrees to Gen. Stanley McChrystal's request for additional troops -- and how and when it ends will shape Washington's future relationship with Kabul. The eventual results of Afghanistan's presidential election notwithstanding, the lack of a strong central government could make it difficult to build postwar ties, since there may be no leaders or institutions powerful or legitimate enough to sway the public.
Still, the parallels should not be ignored. After the war in Indochina, the United States wanted to build a close relationship with Vietnam, an important player in a critical region; Afghanistan has even higher strategic value. And much like Vietnam after the war, Afghanistan would have its own reasons for seeking strong ties to the United States. While Hanoi feared being dominated by its giant neighbor China, Afghanistan could use an outside power's help to hedge against the influence of regional powers such as Iran, Pakistan, India and China.
In Vietnam, just as the battle for public opinion was critical to the fight against an enemy enmeshed in the civilian population, it was also important to postwar reconciliation. Similarly, after the Afghan war, one can imagine U.S. investigations into the lasting impact of the conflict on the population, perhaps a well-publicized government study on the effects of airstrikes and an acknowledgement of the damage done on the ground.
Congress, meanwhile, could steal a page from the Vietnam Education Foundation Act of 2000, which established a foundation to support exchanges between the old adversaries, such as bringing Vietnamese graduate students to the United States and paying for American academics to teach in Vietnam. Such a program could ensure that the next generation of Afghan leaders sees an image of the United States beyond that of the war.
American servicemen and women often return to the United States seeking to improve lives and conditions in the countries where they served, and new vets could be critical to rebuilding ties with Afghanistan after the war. With support from the U.S. Agency for International Development or other aid agencies, veterans going back to Afghanistan to do nonprofit work could not only improve Afghans' standard of living but also promote the kind of healing that veterans groups fostered in Vietnam.
The stated goal of the Vietnam War was the defeat of communism. But three decades later, the United States has gotten much of what it really fought for: a stable friend who could prove an ally against China. After all, it was China, the expansionist giant, that terrified American policymakers and sparked U.S. interest in Indochina in the first place.
Of course, a close relationship with Vietnam will never erase the pain of the war, and the ability to forge closer links today does not mean that the United States was wise to escalate the conflict there decades ago. Still, once Washington decided to fight on in Vietnam, a postwar reconciliation made sense for both sides -- politically, strategically and economically. In Afghanistan, where the United States has been fighting for eight years, it makes sense to consider how to build a postwar relationship.
As in Vietnam, the stated aim of the Afghan war -- denying al-Qaeda a haven, thereby protecting the United States -- to some extent masks the larger goal: building a stable, pro-Washington nation that, in the long run, can provide enough political and economic success to dry up militant groups' recruiting pool. Reaching that goal will require as much savvy postwar planning as it does smart war-fighting.
Joshua Kurlantzick is a fellow for southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of "Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World."


