Lessons for U.S. in report on Pakistan-Afghanistan border efforts

Two years ago, along the unstable Pakistan-Afghanistan border -- where Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters were established and U.S. forces had begun their Predator missile strikes -- the U.S. Agency for International Development signed off on a three-year, $43.4 million project called "Capacity Building for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas."

The idea was to teach government officials there to use computers and improve their relationships with the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that provide assistance. Last week, the USAID inspector general reported that the project contractor, Bethesda-based Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), had "achieved little with regard to the program's two main goals."

The details behind the failure should be studied as the Obama administration begins its all-out attempt to provide similar governmental and economic assistance in the battlefields of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Six years earlier, the Pakistani government tried to establish a strong presence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) through a 500-member FATA Secretariat. The secretariat was charged with providing overall governance, including services such as education, health care and public works. Beyond its immediate staff, it managed 30,000 employees, mostly teachers and health-care workers.

To boost the secretariat and an associated organization, the FATA Development Authority, the USAID contract called for technical training in information technology, development planning, project and financial management, and media affairs. Similar training was envisioned for the NGOs, including providing computers to link them with the secretariat.

One of the first problems was the months-long delays to work out practical plans to get the projects started from DAI's base in Peshawar. For example, it took five months for the contractor to develop its work plan for the first year, which by then was almost at the halfway mark. It took nine months to compile a list of NGOs working with FATA and have them screened and vetted for any terrorists or insurgent connections.

In addition to the delays in strategy for the computer programming and hiring of staff, the media affairs efforts, including the first FATA radio broadcasts, were five months behind schedule.

There were other unexpected bumps. In September 2008, the original head of DAI's group in Pakistan resigned. The job was not filled until January 2009. In addition, security concerns -- including the November 2008 assassination of another USAID contractor -- led DAI to move its headquarters to Islamabad. As a result, the contract received an additional $2.2 million for moving expenses, the hiring of a security manager, two armored cars and security guards.

The contractor's 2009 plan called for two computerized monitoring and reporting systems. One was to display a map that would show the inputs and outcomes of all development projects in the tribal areas. The other was a database for the planning authority that would track how funds would be spent on a proposed project.

The USAID inspector general found that, as of November 2009, DAI "had not come close to completing either of the two systems even though the contractor had projected that both systems would be completed by June 2010." The failure was attributed to "slow startup in the first year" and "subsequent funding delays, among other reasons."

One of those reasons involving the map system was attributed to the USAID mission in Pakistan, which wanted only USAID programs shown -- rather than all FATA programs, as originally planned. The USAID map system was launched at the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar in September, while as of November little progress had been made on the one for the FATA Secretariat.

The collection of data for the planning authority's database started in spring 2009 and continued through the year. As of November, many of the forms for completing the database had not been received.

On top of all the on-the-ground problems for the DAI contract, the Obama administration came into office that January and by June had decided to change the emphasis of U.S. strategy in Pakistan, moving from primarily funneling money through NGOs to putting the bulk of Washington assistance through the government in Islamabad. As a result, the contract was held up. In October, the company was told to consider a 90-day demobilization plan, and a month later no final decision had been made.

In a statement Monday, DAI said the USAID inspector general's report had "significant gaps." The project is continuing, the statement said, and DAI is "proud of the work its team has done" in the FATA, which it called "one of the most challenging security and political environments in the world."

The lessons for the future are many. First, know in detail the situation on the ground, including the capabilities of the people being helped. Second, set realistic goals. Third, have security in hand. Fourth, USAID should avoid changing projects in midstream.