A Peek Under the PR Mask

"Also, he said, the administration needs to develop valid and convincing measures of success in Iraq, 'so he himself knows whether he is winning.'

"Finally, Feaver said, the administration should worry less about communicating the strength of its resolve and more about 'how their behind-the-scenes actions undercut their rhetoric.' "

So how much of that advice is the White House taking? Only a little part of it, really.

Feaver and Gelpi were Live Online on washingtonpost.com in 2003, shortly before the war began, and Feaver speculated on Bush's possible Achilles Heel:

"President Bush subscribes to the momentum theory of politics: that success breeds success, and political capital accrues to the one who spends political capital. So far, this has worked remarkably well . . .

"But the danger is that it can lead to over-reach -- if President Bush misjudges popular sentiment while pursuing this strategy he is likely to fall much further/faster than a more cautious politician who triangulated every issue and never tried to lead public opinion anywhere.

"For that reason, public sentiment is probably more important for President Bush than for other presidents -- he is trying to do more and is willing to get out in front of the public more than other Presidents and this makes him more exposed."

And here are Feaver and Gelpi 's home pages at Duke, if you want to read more.

Speech Redux

Richard Wolffe and Holly Bailey write for Newsweek.com: "There are only three major problems with Bush's latest attempt to tie Iraq to 9/11. One is political, another personal, yet another is practical.

"Bush's political problem is that Americans may like the memory of his response to 9/11, but the fear of Al Qaeda has faded dramatically . . .

"The personal problem is one of credibility and confusion. . . . In a news conference in October 2003, Bush himself said the suicide bombers were 'Baathists and foreign terrorists.'. . . . That picture of the enemy was reversed on Tuesday. Now the president says the enemy consists of foreign fighters who have linked up with a few Saddam loyalists. . . .

"Then there's the practical problem. If foreign fighters are finding it easy to enter Iraq and attack U.S. forces, what's to stop them leaving just as easily? And if there's such a big pool of them outside Iraq, what's to stop some of them traveling to Washington instead of Baghdad?"