The Delusional Duo

Who's more delusional about Iraq: President Bush or Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki?

Whichever side of that argument you're on, a classified memo from national security adviser Steve Hadley to President Bush -- leaked to the New York Times yesterday -- gives you more ammunition.

The memo describes a guy who talks a good game, but is ultimately clueless and incompetent -- and who has been lulled into believing that his rhetoric is true by a small circle of like-minded advisers.

That's Maliki.

But then the memo then suggests ways that Bush could bolster Maliki and his government that themselves are wildly unrealistic.

It's a heckuva memo. You can read the whole thing here.

And meanwhile, of course, both Bush and Maliki continue to deny that a civil war is taking place in Iraq.

The Memo

Michael R. Gordon writes in the New York Times: "A classified memorandum by President Bush's national security adviser expressed serious doubts about whether Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki had the capacity to control the sectarian violence in Iraq and recommended that the United States take new steps to strengthen the Iraqi leader's position.

"The Nov. 8 memo was prepared for Mr. Bush and his top deputies by Stephen J. Hadley, the national security adviser, and senior aides on the staff of the National Security Council after a trip by Mr. Hadley to Baghdad.

"The memo suggests that if Mr. Maliki fails to carry out a series of specified steps, it may ultimately be necessary to press him to reconfigure his parliamentary bloc, a step the United States could support by providing 'monetary support to moderate groups,' and by sending thousands of additional American troops to Baghdad to make up for what the document suggests is a current shortage of Iraqi forces."

Again, here's the text of the memo. It starts off: "We returned from Iraq convinced we need to determine if Prime Minister Maliki is both willing and able to rise above the sectarian agendas being promoted by others. . . .

"While there does seem to be an aggressive push to consolidate Shia power and influence, it is less clear whether Maliki is a witting participant. The information he receives is undoubtedly skewed by his small circle of Dawa advisers, coloring his actions and interpretation of reality. His intentions seem good when he talks with Americans, and sensitive reporting suggests he is trying to stand up to the Shia hierarchy and force positive change. But the reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action."